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Preface 
This Consolidated Draft Report is submitted to the World Bank by Oxford Policy Management (OPM) 
and The IRIS Center at the University of Maryland, College Park (IRIS) under World Bank Purchase 
Order 1272039, for consulting services for Trade in Financial Services: Mobile Banking in Southern 
Africa. 
The objective of the project, as set out in the Terms of Reference (TOR), is to positively influence the 
expansion of access to finance through the rapid, but safe, take off of domestic and cross-border 
branchless  banking,  with  appropriate  protections  for  customers  and  the  financial  system  by 
encouraging (i) the use of incentives that encourage innovative bank and non-bank led domestic and 
international m-banking solutions; (ii) the establishment of appropriate financial system infrastructure, 
and its good governance; and (iii) the establishment of proportionate regulation which provides an 
open but safe environment. 
The focus countries for the project are Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia.  
The work that has let to the current report, in accordance with the TOR, consisted of:  
  A  literature  review  in  September/October  2008  resulting  in  an  inception  report  submitted  in 
October 2008, confirming or modifying the proposed work plan as appropriate, and firming up the 
questionnaire for the diagnostic template; 
  Discussion of the inception report and agreement of the work plan with the World Bank Task 
Team Leader (Sam Maimbo); 
  A  visit  by  the  Tânia  Saranga  (World  Bank)  and  Jerry  Grossman  to  the  target  countries  in 
November-December 2009; 
  Draft country diagnostics for each of the five countries submitted to the World Bank in February 
2009,  and  a  synoptic  table,  draft  policy  recommendations  and  a  draft  workshop  presentation 
submitted early in March. 
  Feedback from a peer review of the main documents received in mid-March. 
This Consolidated Draft Report draws together the previous documents into a single report, taking 
account of the feedback in the peer review and of further research by OPM and IRIS. 
We are very grateful to the World Bank, and particularly to Sam Maimbo and Tânia Saranga for their 
invaluable support in organizing the country visits and in facilitating the development of the reports. 
We are also grateful to those who gave of their time to speak to us during and after the country visits 
and to those who provided feedback in the peer reviews, which gave us useful new insights into the 
subject and pointers on presentation. 
The  responsibility  for  any  remaining  errors  in  the  present  report,  however,  lies  entirely  with  the 
authors. It should be borne in mind that this is a very fast moving field, so it is quite likely that some 
of the information in this report (written in April 2009), will already be out of date by the time the 




The  objective  of  the  project  under  which  this  report  is  submitted  is  to  positively  influence  the 
expansion of access to finance through the rapid, but safe, take off of domestic and cross-border 
branchless banking, with appropriate protections for customers and the financial system. The key 
focus of the study is on cross-border payment services 
The  migration  patterns  in  Southern  Africa  have  important  implications  for  domestic  and  cross-
border remittances, the two key migration corridors being (a) Namibia-Angola-Zambia; and (b) South 
Africa-Mozambique-Malawi. In some cases, refugees tend to constitute a significant proportion of 
immigrants in a country, and the flow patterns tend to be significantly influenced by proximity (and 
much less by income). The patterns of cross-border migration are complex, and do not appear to 
conform entirely to the normal distinctions between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. 
Similarly, there is a complex mix of skilled and unskilled migrants, and there therefore is no simple 
correlation between migration and financial exclusion. While most migrants in the region continue to 
be male, there is an increasing pattern of feminization of migration in the region.  
Domestic migration is also widespread, linked to rapid urbanization in the focus countries. Internal 
migrations have greatly contributed to the enlargement of the informal sector within the countries and 
in some cases, to the growth of urban agriculture. Rural-urban migration has also resulted in many 
―geographically split households,‖ with important implications for the demand for m-baking. 
The means of sending remittances for both cross-border and domestic migrants include banks or 
other formal financial intermediaries, post offices, money transfer operators (e.g. Western Union and 
Moneygram), or by carrying cash by hand (personally or through an agent such as a friend, a relative 
or a taxi driver). The informal channels are inextricably linked with the informal nature of migration in 
the region, with important consequences for the relative ease and security of money transfers. The 
relatively high costs of sending remittances through the formal financial sector are also an important 
factor in determining patterns of demand. 
In relation to trade patterns, it is informal cross border trade that is the main potential source of 
demand for cross-border m-banking services. Individuals cross borders to sell small amounts of goods 
– for example, as informal street traders. While such individuals are not strictly classified as migrants, 
some  studies  describe  these  informal  traders  as  ―amongst  the  most  enterprising  and  energetic  of 
contemporary migrants‖ Interestingly, the same study noted that informal traders crossing the borders 
tend to be mostly female (70%). Thus, informal cross-border trade is said to be closely linked to the 
feminization of migration described earlier. 
Despite the importance of informal cross border trade  – especially with respect to livelihood and 
income generation among the poor in the region – policies tend to favour formal (and often larger) 
trade activities. Efforts have, however, been made in some countries to address some of the key 
challenges being faced by informal traders. As with migration, the problem is that it is difficult to 
make an estimate of the true size of informal trading activity and the volume of informal trade-related 
payment transactions between the countries. One might expect that – as in the case of labour migration 
– income, proximity and networks will likely be the factors influencing the magnitude and direction of 
informal trading across borders. 
In  terms  of  the  financial  sector  landscape,  most  of  the  focus  countries  have  either  fully  or 
substantially implemented financial sector reform programmes. In the last decade, countries‘ financial 
markets  have  expanded,  with  a  noted  increase  in  the  number  of  commercial  banks  operating  in 
countries  like  Zambia,  and  measures  have  also  been  taken  to  reduce  government  ownership  or 
privatize state-owned banks such as in Malawi. However, despite these recent developments in several Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
areas, the degree of competition in financial markets in a number of countries still remains limited to a 
few operators, and there is only a thin supply of financial instruments. In general, the financial sectors 
(especially in most of what may be considered migrant-sending countries) are characterized by: weak 
competitive  environment  (especially  in  the  remittance  market);  lack  of  access  to  technology-
supporting payments and settlement system; and burdensome regulatory and compliance requirements 
(for banks).  
The countries in Southern Africa are all at different levels of  information and communications 
technology  (ICT),  with  comparatively  more  developed  ICT  sectors  among  the  higher  income 
countries like South Africa and Namibia. In Zambia, Angola and Malawi, the telecommunications 
sector is still mainly characterized by the monopoly of state-owned operators or service providers. 
Only a few countries in the region already have extensive telecommunications backbones in place that 
employ  a  combination  of  microwave  radio  relays  and  fibre-optic  cables  with  other  countries  in 
advanced stages of deploying their backbones. Some of the countries in the region are landlocked 
(Zambia and Malawi) without the possibility of direct connection to submarine fibre. Such countries 
will have to rely on expensive satellite links for their international traffic and may be unable to afford 
or access high bandwidth links. Moreover, there are few countries with an extensive and high-speed 
backbone and access network to reach out to many users, which creates an artificially ―low‖ demand 
for bandwidth. And even where an extensive broadband-capable backbone and access network exist, 
such as in South Africa and Namibia, the prices of high-speed connectivity are still very high, way 
beyond the affordability of a greater proportion of the population. This factor, in turn, also contributes 
to an artificially low demand for international bandwidth. Thus, most telecommunications providers in 
the region aim for low-volume-high margin rather than high-volume-low margins in the provision of 
their services. 
These considerations form the background for the detailed Country Diagnostics set out in Annex A 
and summarized in Chapter 4. The diagnostics reveal a wide range of regulatory approaches to BB, 
from the very permissive approach of Zambia to the very restrictive approach of Angola. All countries 
take a more restrictive approach to cross-border transactions than to domestic ones. Table 4.2, a visual 
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Not only do the focus countries have very different regulatory regimes in relation to the potentia l for 
m-banking in general and for cross -border m-banking in particular, they are also at very different 
stages in the development of their m -banking facilities, with m-banking being widespread only in 
South Africa, though its use is also expanding for commercial users in Zambia..  
A number of policy recommendations are made for each country in the course of the Country 
Diagnostics, and these are developed in the draft workshop presentation at Annex D (in a separate 
document) and summarized in chapter 5.  The key recommendations might be briefly summarized as 
follows: 
Key recommendations for regulators and policy makers: 
  Continue to improve regulatory framework for domestic branchless banking and low-value cross-
border transfers in Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia 
  Permit in parallel, as in other pioneer countries (Philippines, Kenya) the development of pilots for 
domestic (when not existing) and cross-border transactions 
                                                 
1 Information on the effects of AML/CFT for Angola is incomplete 
2 Transaction limits in South Africa are restrictive for PostBank, but not very restrictive for banks. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
  As a first step, create regulatory space for domestic branchless banking and low-value cross-
border transfers in Angola and Malawi 
  In the same way, permit pilots for domestic (as a first stage) transactions 
Recommendations regarding pilots 
Considering the relatively favorable environment, it seems possible to start pilots with 3 objectives  
-  Validate the feasibility (technical, business models and processes, etc.) 
-  Validate the potential positive impact (adoption, usage, etc.) 
-  Enable stakeholders to gain experience and allow regulatory framework to evolve in tandem 
with market 
  Variations of (a)  service provider  models and (b) banking-led  models  are suggested for  each 
country. 
  The two models have 
-  positive aspects:  
 make the service available for all mobile clients,  
 the service is developed by security-focused stakeholders who can inspire confidence 
-  negative aspects:  
 promotion of the services could be less extensive than with a strong, motivated mobile 
operator 
  Potentially, some operator-led model can be promoted (for example in Mozambique) 
Finally, a follow up action plan is proposed, consisting of 
  Support for  branchless banking initiatives targeting the unbanked 
  Providing  opportunities  for  stakeholders  in  target  countries  to  learn  from  branchless  banking 
pioneers worldwide 
  Creating opportunities for extensive stakeholder collaboration and 
  A possible pilot project for cross-border transfers 
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1.  Introduction 
As indicated in the Preface, this Consolidated Draft Report is submitted to the World Bank by Oxford 
Policy Management (OPM) and The IRIS Center at the University of Maryland, College Park (IRIS) 
under a project for consulting services for Trade in Financial Services: Mobile Banking in Southern 
Africa. The various documents prepared  during the project  are here drawn together  into a single 
report, taking account of the feedback in the peer review and of further research by OPM and IRIS. 
It  is  intended  that  the  report  will  be  discussed  at  a  Policy  Discussion  Workshop  that  will  being 
together a select group of policy champions from each of the focus countries to discuss appropriate 
incentives that encourage innovative bank and non-bank led domestic and international m-banking 
solutions. 
In this Introduction, we summarize the layout of the report, and then touch upon two over-arching 
issues that need to be taken into account in reading the report: section 1.2 explains why the focus of 
the study has been on payments services, and specifically on cross-border  payments services; section 
1.3 is a reminder that it needs to be borne in mind that the report covers a region in which most 
countries operate a relatively restricted exchange control regime, which has a bearing on both the 
analysis and the recommendations in the report. 
1.1.  The Layout of this Report 
To set the context for m-banking services in the focus countries, chapter 2 reviews the demand for m-
banking services in Southern Africa, particularly in relation to migrant remittances and cross-border 
payments  of  trade-related  transactions.  This  analysis  is  complemented  by  some  international 
comparisons set out in Annex C. 
On the supply side, chapter 3 briefly describes the financial and telecommunications landscape in 
which the development of m-banking is set. 
The heart of this study is the Country Diagnostics set out in Annex A, which examine, for each 
country the regulatory issues that are listed in Annex B. For ease of reference, the results of the 
Country Diagnostics are summarized in chapter 4. 
The Country Diagnostics include a number of recommendations to overcome the constraints on the 
development of accessible m-banking in each country and the region, which are developed further in 
the draft presentation for the Workshop in Annex D (a separate document).  The main threads of the 
key recommendations are brought together and summarized in chapter 5. 
1.2.  The Focus on Cross-Border Payment Services 
This report focuses mainly on the payment component of m-banking application, which offers the 
greatest potential for trade in financial services. There are two reasons for this focus. Firstly, the 
objective of the project (as stated in the Terms of Reference) ―is to help [the regulatory authorities to] 
ensure that their current and/or future strategies for developing their domestic m-banking platforms are 
sufficiently robust to accommodate the cross border financial transactions of their migrant populations 
(largely migrants to South Africa) and their trading partners‖. In this sense, although the TOR also 
indicate that this project aims ―to positively influence the expansion of access to finance through the 
rapid, but safe, take off of domestic and cross-border branchless banking‖, the focus needs to be 
mainly cross-border trade and remittances payments. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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The second reason is a more substantive one. Experience shows that customers use branchless banking 
channels primarily to make payments and send transfers,, even in situations where most BB channels 
offer a broader range of services.
3 It is notable that most providers focus their marketing efforts almost 
exclusively on these services. M-Pesa is a good example of this: they advertise their services as ―an 
affordable, fast, convenient, and safe way to transfer money by SMS anywhere in Kenya.‖  
The uses of M-Pesa by its customers illustrates very well the predominance of the use of money 
transfer services by m-banking customers in developing countries, as shown in Figure 2.1: some 54 
percent of M-Pesa activities are used to send or receive transfers of money while, for example, bill 
payment accounts for only 1 percent of the total use of M-Pesa .
4 
Figure 1.1  The Most Common Uses for M-Pesa in Kenya 
 
 
Source: Jack. and Suri. (2009).  
This focus on payments and transfers is partly explained by the fact that most m-banking projects have 
been led by mobile operators. This is the case of the Philippines or Kenya, where GXI and Safaricom 
designed mobile banking initiatives without any banking participation at all. The main implication of 
that is that BB providers have valued ease of implementation and adoption over depth of services, 
which sometimes constrains customer choices.  
The predominance of payment services over other services also reflects the perceived relative value 
that each service brings to its users. Thus, for example, the Banco Postal in Brazil has reported that 
BB has not yet succeeded in changing poor people‘s perception of the limited value proposition of 
saving in formal financial institutions. When they receive a payment or remittance, an overwhelming 
majority of people go to the agent to withdraw the full amount received.
5  
                                                 
3 This is, for example, the case for WIZZIT in South Africa – its customers buy airtime more than twice as often 
as they withdraw funds from a branch or ATM: CGAP Focus Note No 46, The early experience with Branchless 
Banking. (CGAP 2008b) 
4 Jack and  Suri. (2009).  
5  For  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  relative  impact  of   different  models  of  branchless  banking,  and  their 
implications for Southern Africa, see OPM (2008).  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
1.3.  The Exchange Control Context 
It  is  important to  note  that  most  of  the  Southern African  countries  included  in  this  review  have 
relatively  restricted  exchange  control  regimes.  This  has  obvious  implications  for  cross-border 
remittances, including mobile phone remittances. Many countries where cross-border mobile phone 
transfers are well established and of high volume, like Mexico and the Philippines, have very liberal 
exchange  control  regimes.  In  the  case  of the  Philippines,  for  example,  Filipino  workers in  many 
countries can very easily transfer money home directly through GCash, in the same way as they would 
send money if they were in the Philippines. That is possible because G-Xchange,
6 with the support of 
the Central Bank of the Philippines, has negotiated similar arrangements with reliable suppliers in a 
variety of host countries on a corridor by corridor basis. According to the Central Bank, this would not 
have been possible if the Philippines did not have an open capital account with a very liberal foreign 
exchange regime.
7 
                                                 
6 GCash is a service offered by G-Xchange, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Globe Telecom. 
7 Conversation with Pia Bernadette Roman, Head of Inclusive Finance  Advocacy, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 
London, 12 March 2009. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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2.  Understanding the Demand for Mobile Banking Services in Southern Africa 
8 
In this chapter, we explore the demand for mobile banking services in the Southern African countries 
covered in this assignment. The countries include: Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Zambia, South 
Africa and Namibia.
9 The discussion covers the two key areas where there is a strong demand for 
mobile banking services, namely: (i) migrant remittances, and (ii) cross -border payments of trade-
related transactions.. 
In Annex C we have also set out some international comparisons, to put the situation in Southern 
Africa in its international context. These comparisons are drawn upon as required in the report. 
2.1.  Migration patterns in Southern Africa: implications for domestic and cross-border 
remittances 
Table 2.1 below provides the key data on the countries covered, to help contextualize the findings on 
the patterns in migration between the countries in the region. 
Table 2.1.  Basic country data 
 
Source: World Bank – World Development Indicators and key country data and statistics, as of 2007 
(unless otherwise indicated). 
2.1.2.  Cross-border migration 
The available data on migration capture the flow of registered migrants only. Thus, it is difficult to 
determine the true size of migration flows within the region and the relationships between the different 
countries. Nevertheless, the estimates of migration flows (as presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3 below), 
while only capturing formal labour migrants, suggest the existence of migration corridors, namely: (a) 
Namibia-Angola-Zambia; and (b) South Africa-Mozambique-Malawi.
10 It is important to note that 
                                                 
8 This chapter and chapter 3 are based on the material presented in the Inception Report (after the literature 
review), modified as required following the field visits. 
9 Although Namibia is not a focus country for this study, we have had to take account of data for Namibia in the 
current chapter because it is the principal receiving country for migrants from Angola. 
10 The South Africa-Mozambique corridor is  considered among the top ten migratio n corridors in the Sub -
Saharan African region. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
there is some traffic between Angola, Zambia and Malawi, although it is difficult to ascertain at this 
point to what extent this is driven mainly by movements of refugees. Figure 2.1 below shows the flow 
patterns between the countries. 
Figure 2.1  Countries of study  
 
In some cases, refugees tend to constitute a significant proportion of immigrants in a country (e.g. 
55.4% in Zambia, and 25.3% in Angola), which makes it difficult to clearly establish the relationships 
between  them  (i.e.  between  migrant-sending  and  migrant-receiving  countries).  In  2004,  445,000 
Angolan refugees were registered abroad, the majority of whom were in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo  (DRC),  Namibia  and  Zambia.  Zambia  has  experienced  major  refugee  influxes  in  the  last 
decade 
In Southern Africa, the flow patterns tend to be significantly influenced by proximity (and much less 
by income). This is consistent with the World Bank findings on what they refer to as South-South 
migration flows (World Bank, 2006): as the income differentials between these countries tend to be 
relatively modest (compared to North-South relationships), proximity and networks are likely to have 
a proportionally greater influence on movement patterns. The study adds that motivations for South-
South migration also include seasonal patterns and flight from ecological disasters or civil conflict, 
which characterize some of the countries in this study (e.g. Angola and Malawi).  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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Table 2.2.  Migration patterns 
 
Source: World Bank Fact Book on Migration and Remittances, 2008. 
 
The relationship between the border countries is also explained by the strong historical and socio-
economic ties between the populations (or sub-groups within the population). For example, given the 
historical and linguistic linkages with Angola, Portugal is the main destination for Angolan migrants 
outside Africa. However, the ―majority of Angolans first migrate to one of the neighbouring countries 
- Namibia and Zambia mainly‖ (Ammassari, 2005, p.34). Studies show that most of the undocumented 
migration into Namibia comes from Angola, given the ties between Namibians living in the central 
north of the country and Angola. Zambia is in a similar situation: given the links between Lozi-
speaking people in southern Zambia and Caprivians in north-east Namibia, it is very likely that there 
is a lot of undocumented border-crossing in this part of the region (Frayne and Pendleton, 2002).  
Namibia‘s porous borders with Angola and Zambia and the absence of policing are other reasons 
given to explain the movements of migrants. In a study by Frayne and Pendleton (2002), they found 
that majority of the people crossing the border were doing so on foot, while 2% crossed the border 
using bicycles. This suggested a high tendency of circular movements within the vicinity of the border 
– mostly short stays for commercial purposes. This is confirmed by the frequency of crossing: nearly 
20% crossed the border every day; 16% a couple of times per week; and 17% once a week.
11 
Thus, estimating the true size of migration flows between the Southern African countries is very 
difficult, given the extent of illegal movements in the region. Various studies emphasize that the 
nature of current migration in the region – especially of flows from migrant-sending countries such as 
Malawi and Mozambique – is for work in the informal sector. This is partly demonstrated by the 
massive deportations which have occurred in some of the migrant-receiving countries: in 2001, for 
example,  the  Department  of  Home  Affairs  in  South  Africa  deported  more  than  150,000  illegal 
                                                 
11 This is also confirmed in another  study by Crush et al  (2005):  the  majority of cross-border migrants  in 
Southern Africa remain circular migrants. ―Although many stay for longer than initially intended, their visits are 
generally seen as temporary‖ (p.8). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
immigrants. 60% of these came from Mozambique, while 1.3% came from Malawi (Truen et al, 
2005). 
Table 2.3.  Bilateral estimates of migrant stocks 
 
Source: University of Sussex and World Bank estimates, 2006.  
Notes: Bilateral migration data were created by applying weights based on bilateral migrant stocks 
(from population censuses of individual countries) to the UN Population Division's estimates of total 
migrant stocks in 2005. See World Bank (2006). 
 
Our initial assumption was that given the relative differences in employment and wage standards 
between the countries (e.g. relatively higher incomes in countries like Namibia and South Africa), a 
classification of countries can be made, allowing the distinction between those which are sources of 
migrant populations or migrant-sending countries and those which receive migrant populations or 
migrant-receiving countries.
12 However, the available data on bilateral estimates of migration (Table 
2.3) show what we consider at this point some form of possible anomaly. For example, while both 
Namibia and South Africa received more migrants than they sent to their neighbouring countries, 
countries like Malawi and Zambia also show a similar pattern (i.e. these countries tend to be net 
receivers of migrants in the region).  Considering the results of studies undertaken on migration in the 
region and observations made on the ground in these countries, we assume that the data available will 
not be able to provide us with a true representation of the magnitude of flows between the said 
countries.  
The repatriation (in countries like South Africa) is likely to indicate high levels of poor and unskilled 
migrants in the region - which can be expected to be the group that experiences the greatest financial 
exclusion (Truen et al, 2005). For example, a recent study showed tha t most migration out of 
Mozambique is of unskilled workers: only 15% of the migrants have secondary education, most (70%) 
have primary education only, while 8% have no education at all. 
On the other hand, there is a significant proportion of highly skilled migrant workers from some of the 
countries. This is especially true of Zambia where emigration is not high by regional standards, but the 
pattern is skewed towards the skilled. A study by Amin and Mattoo (2007) shows that the emigration 
                                                 
12 In Africa, there is a more pronounced pattern of emigration from low-income than middle-income countries, 
and most emigrants from low-income economies go to neighbouring countries. This is in contrast to emigrants 
from middle-income countries in the region, more of whom go to industrial countries (Lucas, 2005). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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rate amongst those with tertiary education in Zambia is about 35 times that of those with secondary 
education. The available data (Table 2.2) also shows very high proportions of skilled migrants leaving 
Mozambique (42% of total emigrants) and Angola (25.6%). ―The pressure of uncertain economic 
conditions in several countries has acted as a push factor sending skilled professionals to the booming 
economies  of  Botswana,  Namibia  and  South  Africa.  These  professionals  work  mostly  in  South 
Africa‘s tertiary institutions, medical establishments and the private sector‖ (Waller, 2006, p.4).This 
characterization of the migrating population in some of the countries will have important implications 
on what constitutes the target market for mobile phone banking – especially in terms of the level of 
financial literacy, asset ownership, cell phone usage, etc. 
Interestingly, while most migrants in the region continue to be male, there is an increasing pattern of 
feminization  of  migration  in  the  region.  Women  migrants  tend  to  have  proportionally  higher 
educational levels than their male counterparts. Despite this, however, ―they are more likely to be 
involved in less skilled and informal work and therefore may be more likely to be irregular migrants‖ 
(Crush et al, 2005, p. 14). Traditional areas of employment for women (internal and cross border) have 
been agriculture, domestic work, the service sector and trade. Men are more likely to have formal 
employment, particularly in the industrial, agricultural and construction sectors. 
With regard to age, migration streams were traditionally dominated by young people. However, recent 
studies show that ―41% of migrants coming to South Africa were over the age of 40‖ (Pendleton et al, 
2006, p.2). This suggests that migration has evolved into a ―livelihood strategy of the middle-aged‖. 
Nevertheless, migrants in the region will still largely cover the economically-active age range (i.e. >25 
years). For example, almost half (47%) of the migrants from Mozambique were found to be 25-39 
years old. 
2.1.3.  Domestic or internal migration 
In  addition  to  cross-border  movements,  there  is  also  of  course  a  pattern  of  domestic  or  internal 
migration within the countries. This has contributed to rapid urbanization, which is largely linked to 
rural poverty. Environmental shocks – such as droughts and flooding, have accelerated the process, as 
has the failure to develop the rural/agricultural sector in many of t countries. Internal migrations have 
greatly contributed to the enlargement of the informal sector (within the countries) and in some cases, 
the growth of urban agriculture. Rural-urban migration is part of what has been referred to as the 
―geographically split household‖ phenomenon (Crush et al, 2006, p. 16), where domestic (or even 
cross-border)  migrants  who  find  employment  or  economic  activities  in  the  urban  areas  generate 
income to support their families in the rural areas and thus maintain strong rural linkages. 
  Data from FinScope South Africa (2003) suggested that about 5.7 million South Africans live 
away from their immediate families. The results show that domestic migrant workers have the 
following characteristics: 96.9% of them are black; 63.7% are male; and 84.4% are originally 
from a non-urban area (cited in Truen et al, 2005, p. 14). 
  Over  two-thirds  of  the  population  in  Angola  live  in  poverty,  while  almost  one  out  of  three 
Angolans is extremely poor (Human Development Indicators 2006). The flight of people from 
rural areas during the war years has turned bigger towns into a refuge for the poor. (Ammassari, 
2005, p. 27). The large proportion of unskilled domestic migrants meant that these people turned 
to the informal sector for employment.  
  Internal or domestic migrants in Malawi have been described as behaving like typical ―target 
workers,‖ earning cash incomes in towns and investing/sending money to the rural areas. Studies 
show that almost every rural household in Malawi depends on family members working in towns 
for its farm inputs (Black et al, 2006, p.123). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
2.1.4.  Remittances 
The means of sending remittances for both cross-border and domestic migrants include banks or other 
formal  financial  intermediaries,  post  offices,  money  transfer  operators  (e.g.  Western  Union  and 
Moneygram), or by carrying cash by hand (personally or through an agent such as a friend, a relative 
or a taxi driver). As in the case of migration, it is difficult to estimate the true size of the flows of 
remittances, given that most transfers tend to be made through informal channels.
13   
Tables 2.4 and 2.5 below provide information on remittance inflows an d outflows of the different 
countries, respectively. As has been noted, the data report only officially recorded remittances. The 
true size of remittances, including unrecorded flows through both formal and informal channels, is 
believed to be  much larger. The available data suggests that remittances tend to represent a small 
proportion of the countries‘ GDP: in 2006, Mozambique is the only country in the set where the 
proportion of remittance inflows exceeded 1% of the country‘s GDP.
14 
Table 2.4.  Remittance patterns: inflows (in millions US$) 
 
Source: World Bank Remittances Data. 
Note: The data presented in this table reports officially recorded remittances only. The true size of 
remittances, including unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels, is believed to be 
larger. 
 
The expectation, however, is that migration flows will continue, if not intensify. For example, since 
the end of the civil war in Mozambique, economic migration to South Africa has intensified and now 
Mozambique is the single largest supplier of labour for the mining sector in South Africa. In one 
study, informal remittances were estimated at US$ 32 million (Black et al, 2006). Over and above this, 
there are remittances transmitted through various other channels (within the informal sector) as well as 
                                                 
13 Capturing the true size of remittances is further complicated by the fact that in some studies remittances are 
also understood to cover the remittance of goods (i.e. non-cash), and/or purchasing goods or services for the 
benefit of the households in the countries of origin. For example, while the study of Pendleton et al (2006) 
confirms that the vast majority of migrants in South Africa (85%) send some form of remittances back home, it 
also highlighted that the proportion of migrant-sending households receiving remittances in the form of goods 
varied  from  17%  in  the  case  of  Swaziland  to  as  much  as  65%  in  Mozambique.  The  authors  of  the  study 
underscore that while some studies focus primarily on cash transactions, it is likewise important to ―take into 
account broader concepts like ‗value-packages‘, where remittances are viewed as transfers of both money and 
goods.‖ (Pendleton et al, 2006, p.21). 
14 The available data on remittances (World Bank) show that the shares of remittance inflows to GDP in 2006 
were as high as 3.5% in South Asia, 1.5% in East Asia and the Pacific, 1.9% in Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and 1.6% in Sub -Saharan Africa. Key migrant-sending countries registered inflows equivalent to 
2.9% (Mexico) to as much as 13% (Philippines) of the countries‘ GDP.   Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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remittances of goods, which suggest that migration is a major contributor to Mozambican livelihoods 
and the country‘s foreign exchange earnings.  
Table 2.5.  Remittance patterns: outflows (in millions US$) 
 
Source: World Bank Remittances Data. 
Note: The data presented in this table reports officially recorded remittances only. The true size of 
remittances, including unrecorded flows through formal and informal channels, is believed to be 
larger. 
 
Freund and Spatafora (2005), in their study of the transaction costs and determinants of remittances, 
note that it will be important to know the true size of remittance flows, especially if policy is being 
designed to encourage remittances or stimulate investment in this area. Inaccurate information about 
the size of migration and remittance flows may lead to inappropriate initiatives. Moreover, from an 
efficiency standpoint, a large share of informal remittances in an economy may suggest the need to 
stimulate greater competition among formal financial service providers such as banks and money 
transfer operators. Also, there may be positive externalities from using financial institutions such as 
banks to transfer money, including increased access to credit and the use of financial institutions for 
savings – especially among those who are currently unbanked.  
Regularizing the remittances of undocumented migrants in Southern Africa is likely to be a very 
controversial issue from a political perspective. As there is no way for an undocumented migrant to 
earn money legally in South Africa, for example, all remittances by such migrants are by definition the 
result  of  illegal  employment.  Regulatory  changes  may  need  to  be  implemented  to  regularize  or 
incorporate into a legal business model the remittances of undocumented migrants.
15 
Apart from the issues surrounding the informal nature of migration in the region, it is also important to 
consider the relatively high cost of sending remittances in the formal financial sector, which also 
influences the preference for informal chann els as a means of sending remittances across borders. 
Table 2.6 below reproduces results from the study of Pendleton et al (2006) in South Africa, showing 
the most popular ways of sending remittances. This includes bringing the money themselves (47%), 
sending money via a friend/co-worker (26%), or via the post office (7%). Other important ways of 
transferring money are through TEBA and bank accounts (6% via banks in the home country and less 
than 1% via banks in South Africa).  
                                                 
15 Successful initiatives of this sort have been launched, for example, for Mexican immigrants in the USA. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
Table 2.6.  Method of transfer used in South Africa (based on a study by Pendleton et al, 
2006) 
 
Source: Based on a study by FinMark by Pendleton et al, 2006, see p. 26.  
 
Another study (FinMark Trust 2005, cited in Truen et al, 2006), shows a higher share among the 
respondents who said that they also used banks as a means for executing transfers.  Nevertheless, a 
significant  proportion  of  those  who  made  cross-border  payments  still  cited  the  use  of  informal 
channels (i.e. through friends/relatives/taxi drivers).
16 The main reasons provided for the choice of the 
informal method included: 
  Ease: methods with less paperwork were preferred; 
  Familiarity: the method is also used by family or recommended by friends; 
  Cost: the participants‘ perception about cost is critical; 
  Speed: especially when the remittance is intended to meet an emergency; 
  Risk tolerance: for theft or other losses; 
  Access: how easy it is for the recipient to reach the point of delivery. 
                                                 
16 The differences in the results between these two studies cited (showing results for South Africa) may be 
explained in terms of the possible differences between the sampling method and timing used in each of the 
surveys conducted. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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Table 2.7.  Method of transfer used in South Africa (based on the results of a study by 
FinMark Trust, 2005)  
 
Source: Based on a study by FinMark Trust 2005, cited in Truen et al, 2005. 
Fees in informal networks tend to be lower than in banks or money transfer operators, although not 
necessarily  lower  than postal  orders.  However,  post  offices in  the  region  can  be  slower and less 
reliable  than  other  transfer  modalities.  In  some  countries,  there  may  be  regulatory  restrictions 
impeding the entry of financial institutions (that may have relatively more extensive geographical 
reach and proximity to low-income populations) into the remittance market.  
Table 2.8.  Cost of sending a remittance in South Africa (based on the results of a study by 
FinMark Trust, 2005) 
 
Source: Based on a study by FinMark Trust 2005, cited in Truen et al, 2005. 
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The  data  provided  in  Table  2.8  above  demonstrates  that  while  the  cost  of  sending  international 
remittances is comparable between postal money orders and informal mechanisms, the cost of inter-
account transfers is almost six times that of informal mechanisms, with fees/charges on inter-account 
payments representing more than 50% of the amount sent on average as a remittance (i.e. an average 
of R 300 per month).
17  
2.2.  Trade patterns in Southern Africa: implications for cross-border payments 
In this section, we look at trade patterns between the countries of study, particularly informal cross 
border trade. We define informal cross border trade as economic activities which are unregulated and 
yet are considered legal economic activities - such as the selling of crafts across national borders 
(Chen, 2005).
18  
Informal traders are often portrayed as ―smugglers‖. This perception is based on the fact that most 
informal trade is undocumented, unregistered, and thus unaccounted for in the countries‘ national 
accounts.  In Southern Africa, as in many other parts of the world, the level of trade between countries 
is understated in official statistics because informal cross border trade – which is acknowledged as 
being extensive in the region – is not captured in countries‘ trade statistics. Nevertheless, in many 
cases, duties and taxes are charged to small informal traders who operate across borders. Studies 
estimate that informal trade within SADC contributes an average of over US$17.6 billion per year 
(Musonda, 2004). The typical payments system (supporting these exchanges) has been characterized 
by unrecorded cash-to-cash transactions. 
A study conducted by the Southern African Research and Documentation Centre (SARDC) in 2008 
noted that informal cross border trade is by no means a new phenomenon in the SADC region.  The 
countries in the region have strong historical and cultural relations that influence the level of trade 
activity  especially  between  bordering  countries.  For  example,  informal  cross  border  trade  in 
Zimbabwe dates back to pre-colonial times, where people carried out barter trade without the need for 
formal registration. In modern times, however, there has been a significant emergence of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers. This has partly disrupted informal economic activity. For many years, traders from 
Mozambique and other locations in Southern Africa have regularly crossed into South Africa, usually 
on visitor visas that do not permit trading (Peberdy, 1998). Angolans also cross into Namibia for 
various reasons, including trade (Nangulah and Nickanor, 2005).  
Individuals cross borders to sell small amounts of goods – for example, as informal street traders. 
While such individuals are not strictly classified as migrants, some studies describe these informal 
traders as ―amongst the most enterprising and energetic of contemporary migrants‖ (Crush et at, 2005, 
p. 15). Despite many obstacles, trading remains an important way of generating income among people 
in many countries of the region, especially for those in the low-income segment who are also often 
among  the  unemployed.  For  example,  it  has  been  noted  that  cross-border  trading  is  the  primary 
income generating form of migration for Zambia‘s poor. 
Despite the importance of informal cross border trade  – especially with respect to livelihood and 
income generation among the poor in the region – policies tend to favour formal (and often larger) 
trade activities. Efforts have been made in some countries to address some of the key challenges being 
faced by informal traders. For example, Zimbabwe signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
                                                 
17 In the same study, 23.2% of the migrants remitted amounts ranging from R1,500 and below, while 22.6% sent 
R1,501-5,000 (Truen et al, 2005, see p.21). The average annual remittance was estimated at R3,574.70. 
18 This definition, therefore, does not include informal cross border trade of illegal economic activities - such as 
the sale of stolen goods and illegal drugs. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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with  the  government  of  Malawi  to  facilitate  informal  trade,  specifically  the  facilitation  and 
enhancement of trade and investments between small and medium entrepreneurs, and building the 
capacity of small and medium enterprises through  skills development initiatives. Negotiations are 
currently  underway  for  the  signing  of  similar  MOUs  with  other  neighbouring  countries  such  as 
Zambia, South Africa and Namibia.  
Informal sector cross-border trade is important to the transfer of goods and commodities between 
countries. It also plays a significant role in regional food security, and in the development of small and 
medium enterprises. The United Nations World Food Programme (UN-WFP) notes that significant 
reductions in the overall volume of informal trade may exacerbate the food security situation in some 
countries – which is already very uncertain and unstable in a number of countries, such as Malawi.
19  
The study conducted by SARDC in 2008 describes informal cross border traders as including: 
  Traders or merchants who under-declare their imported goods/wares;  
  Traders or merchants who do not declare anything at all (smugglers);  
  Traders or merchants who do not declare through clearing agents;  
  Traders or merchants who sell directly to the final consumer; and 
  Agents of established wholesalers and retailers.  
The study looked at traders at different borders. For example, traders from Zimbabwe who buy goods 
from  South  Africa  may  use  buses,  own  transportation  or  may  have  delivery  agents  known  as 
malayitshas or ―runners‖. These agents carry the goods from places such as Johannesburg, clear them 
at Beitbridge and deliver to destinations in Bulawayo and Harare. Their pickup trucks are observed to 
be  often  dangerously  overloaded.  Malayitshas  are  known  for  undervaluing  declarations  to  evade 
customs duties.  
Traders who do not declare their goods at all were observed to be the most prevalent at border posts. 
These  traders  bring  their  merchandise  from  either  Mbeya  or  Kyela  in  Tanzania  or  Karonga  and 
Lilongwe in Malawi, on minibuses or hauling trucks. They usually disembark before they reach the 
border points. They then hire cargo boys (on bicycles) who then carry the goods via alternative paths 
to avoid customs.  
Interestingly, the same study noted that informal traders crossing the borders tend to be mostly female 
(70%). Thus, informal cross-border trade is said to be closely linked to the feminization of migration 
described earlier. This is not surprising, considering that informal cross border trade is considered a 
source of income and employment, especially by those in the low-income segments of the population, 
including women. Women who are unable to find employment seek other opportunities for generating 
income such as by engaging in informal trade activities. The study estimates that the monthly value of 
goods traded (per trader) in the region averaged US$2,506. 
As with migration, the problem is that it is difficult to make an estimate of the true size of informal 
trading activity and the volume of informal trade-related payment transactions between the countries. 
One might expect that – as in the case of labour migration – income, proximity and networks will 
likely be the factors influencing the magnitude and direction of informal trading across the borders. 
                                                 
19 The UN-WFP publishes reports on informal cross border food trade for several countries monitored under the 
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3.  The Financial and Telecommunications Landscape 
Parallel  to  the  discussion  in  the  previous  chapter,  this  section  describes  the  supply  landscape  – 
specifically, the financial and telecommunications sectors in the countries of study. Issues specific to 
the development of each of these sectors (on a region-wide or country level) as they relate to the 
provision of mobile banking services in these countries are discussed herein.  
3.1.  The financial sector 
The development of a sound financial sector and efficient payment systems are essential for increasing 
cross-border flows. This includes, among other things, developing the commercial banking sector and 
other financial institutions, strengthening the domestic payments system, developing foreign trade 
financing instruments and establishing correspondent banking relationships between countries in the 
region. 
Most of the countries in this study have either fully or substantially implemented financial sector 
reform programmes. In the last decade, countries‘ financial markets have expanded, with a noted 
increase in the number of commercial banks operating in countries like Zambia, and measures have 
also been taken to reduce government ownership or privatize state-owned banks such as in Malawi. 
However, despite these recent developments in several areas, the degree of competition in financial 
markets in a number of countries still remains limited to a few operators, and there is only a thin 
supply of financial instruments.  
In  general,  the  financial  sectors  (especially  in  most  of  what  may  be  considered  migrant-sending 
countries) are characterized by: weak competitive environment (especially in the remittance market); 
lack of access to technology-supporting payments and settlement system; and burdensome regulatory 
and compliance requirements (for banks).  
3.1.1.  A brief on the financial sector in Angola 
Angola is a country that is still recovering from a long period of conflict that ended in 2002. Such 
experiences  of  conflict  tend  to  leave  a  legacy  characterized  by  weak  governance  of  institutions, 
depressed incomes, degraded infrastructure and public service systems, high inflation and high level 
of economic uncertainty, critical problems associated with physical security and property rights, high 
levels of unemployment, and shortage of human and institutional capacity.  Despite these obstacles, by 
2007  Angola  succeeded  in  achieving  rapid  growth  driven  by  an  oil  boom,  combined  with  an 
aggressive program of reconstruction. The political situation has stabilized and security conditions in 
the country have been showing signs of improvement.  
In the financial sector, Angola has moved beyond its initial post-conflict state. It is now confronting 
the complexities of establishing a sound and efficient financial system to support broad-based growth 
and rapid job creation for its population. However, this is expected to take time primarily because it 
requires the development of skills in the financial system, a supportive legal and judicial system, and 
improvements  in  the country‘s  business  climate.  In  its  Doing  Business  Assessment  for 2008,  the 
World Bank ranks Angola as having one of the least supportive environments in the world for private 
investment. Bank loans and deposits have grown very rapidly over the past two years in Angola; 
however,  credit  to  the  private  sector still  amounted  to just  7.2%  of  GDP  in mid-2007,  and  total 
deposits amounted to only 15.7% of GDP. Significantly, a great majority of the country‘s population 
remain outside the reach of formal financial system: estimates show that banks were reaching only 6% 
of the entire population.  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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3.1.2.  A brief on the financial sector in Malawi 
The  financial  system  in  Malawi  is  small,  underdeveloped  and  dominated  by  a  few  financial 
institutions that offer a limited range of services (BIS, 2005). The problems and limitations in the 
modernization of the payments system in Malawi is driven in part by the: 
  Lack of commitment of individual banks, given high cost implications; 
  Low level of computerization in the banking sector; 
  Legal and technological shortfalls; and  
  Differences in corporate strategies among banks. 
As in the case of other low-income countries, financial services tend to be concentrated in urban areas 
of the country and do not reach a significant proportion of the country‘s population. Although there 
have been efforts directed at developing the microfinance sector in the country, the sector is still 
dominated by a few major players.  
Important  financial  service  providers  in  the  country  include,  on  the  public  sector  side,  three 
parastatals: 
  The Malawi Savings Bank (MSB), successor to the failed Postal Savings Bank and wholly owned 
by the government, is considered the only ―rural bank‖ that is actively targeting micro-clients (for 
savings). However, it is in precarious financial condition. 
  The Malawi Rural Finance Company (MRFC), which is also wholly owned by the government 
and successor to the failed Smallholder Agriculture Credit Association (SACA), supplies more 
than 50% of micro-credit in Malawi and is highly dependent on subsidies. 
  Other parastatal entities include those involved in subsidized, or directed micro-lending, such as 
the Small Enterprise Development Organization of Malawi (SEDOM) and the Development of 
Malawian  Enterprise  Trust  (DEMAT).  Of  the  two  only  DEMAT  has  an  active  microcredit 
program and the running costs of both organizations are subsidized by the government. 
Apart from private commercial banks, supervision of microfinance is limited and informal, although 
this is expected to change once the new Microfinance Bill is passed and enacted. There are also 
financial cooperatives operating in the country, although they are limited in their capacity to expand 
and grow into significant providers of financial services in the country. The cooperative law in Malawi 
does not adequately distinguish between credit unions and other associative structures nor does it 
address  the  unique  needs  of  federated  apex  structures.  There  are  a  number  of  private  sector 
Microfinance  Companies,  such  as  PRIDE  Malawi  and  FINCA.  Both  these  structures  have  the 
potential to provide financial services on a relatively wider scale. However, neither of them is legally 
able to intermediate savings. 
Overall, there is low market penetration of financial services in Malawi, particularly when it comes to 
savings mobilization. Moreover, there are only very limited financial products available. It is therefore 
not surprising to see client dropout rates in excess of 50%, which indicate that financial service needs 
are not being adequately met by the existing financial service providers. 
3.1.3.  A brief on the financial sector in Mozambique 
The  financial  system  in  Mozambique  is  dominated  by  the  commercial  banking  sector.  Structural 
reforms that have been recently initiated in the financial sector have improved the health of the sector, 
with increasing signs of the ability of institutions to meet liabilities and a decline in bad debts. These 
developments are expected to help improve banks‘ ability to lend and should in time translate into Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
better access to credit and lower lending rates. The imposition of a 50% provisioning requirement on 
foreign currency loans to non-exporters in early 2006 has resulted in a falling level of dollarization in 
the market.  
The Central Bank indicates an increase in the total assets of the banking system of almost 20% in 2005 
and a reduction in average interest rate spreads from 13.8% to 10.8% in the same year. The ratio of 
credit to GDP was around 18% in 2005. Despite these developments, however, the sector remains very 
concentrated in terms of having just a few institutions that mainly operate in Maputo. The Bank of 
Mozambique has registered a total of nine commercial banks, three micro-credit banks and three 
cooperatives under its supervision. 
Access to finance is considered as a key bottleneck for the development of many small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs) and the local economy. Financial service providers are constrained to expand their 
reach and provide services due to high transaction costs related to the transportation, security and 
communications infrastructure in the country. There are also limitations in terms of the pool of human 
resources needed in the financial sector.  
The microfinance sector in Mozambique has grown over the past years, although it also remains 
severely concentrated. Out of about 32 institutions operating in the sector as of 2005, there are only 
four main players (i.e. significant providers of services): this includes three commercial banks and one 
cooperative (Novobanco, Socremo, Tchuma, Banco Opportunidade). NovoBanco, SOCREMO  and 
Tchuma controlled more than two-thirds (68%) of the active portfolio in 2005. NovoBanco controls 
one third of the total active portfolio. The microfinance sector still continues to be largely an urban 
phenomenon.  In  the  rural  areas,  community  based  groups  (similar  to  ROSCAs  or  village-based 
savings  and  loans  associations)  tend  to  be  the  dominant  fixture.  The  recent  launch  of  the  Rural 
Finance Support Programme is directing considerable resources to promote greater coverage of the 
rural-based financial associations (caixas comunitárias) and improving rural finance methodologies. 
3.1.4.  A brief on the financial sector in South Africa 
South Africa has the deepest and most sophisticated banking sector in Africa. The financial services 
sector is backed by a sound regulatory and legal framework, and there are domestic and foreign 
institutions providing a full range of services - commercial, retail and merchant banking, mortgage 
lending, insurance and investment.  
South Africa's banking sector compares favourably with  those of industrialised countries. Foreign 
banks are well represented and electronic banking facilities are extensive, with a nationwide network 
of automatic teller machines (ATMs) and internet banking facilities available.
20 
South Africa is also the centre   of innovation in Africa: the field of remote access banking and 
origination of bank accounts by agents operating on behalf of banks is a well established practice in 
South Africa (a very large number of Mzansi accounts have been opened in this way).  There are many 
financial services that can be operated remotely by the customer and not merely initiated in that way 
(OPM, 2008), including: 
  two cellphone banking operations aimed specifically at providing remotely accessible domestic 
money transmission (Wizzit and MTN MobileMoney); 
                                                 
20 This description, taken from www.southafrica.info, while predictably glowing, is nonetheless accurate. 
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  Nedbank‘s correspondent banking model based on an alliance arrangement with the Pick & Pay 
supermarket chain; 
  Capitec‘s GlobalOne traditional bank account that offers card-based payments and cash-out via 
supermarkets; 
  ABSA‘s AllPay unit that has a contract from government to pay out social security benefits and 
pensions in Gauteng and parts of Eastern Cape (South Africa) via a card-based product; 
  Teba Bank‘s remote access sub-accounts and its new Acard product; 
  a number of initiatives that allow clients to use remote methods to pay insurance premiums (by 
Alliance, Discovery Life, Hollard Insurance and others).  
3.1.5.  A brief on the financial sector in Zambia 
As in most countries in the region, the financial sector in Zambia is dominated by the commercial 
banks.
21 They have around a million users but almost certainly fewer clients, which is about as many 
as the rest of the formal sector put together  –  including  savings  banks,  building  societies, social 
microfinance institutions and commercial microlenders. The assets of the commercial banks, at ZMK 
8 trillion, are almost ten times as great as the rest of the sector put together. 
Through a steady and consistent reform programme, Zambia has achieved macro-economic stability, 
and there is general consensus that the regulation of the financial sector is reasonably designed to 
favour access to financial services. In particular, Zambia is fortunate to have a single financial services 
law that gives a coherent overall regulatory framework for all different types of supplier of banking or 
similar services. The only area of the law that might possibly be said to hold up access is the limit it 
puts on the involvement in financial services of non-financial corporations.  Zambia already has a Real 
Time  Gross  Settlement  (RTGS)  system  that  is  evolving  in  line  with  the  financial  sector,  while 
approval to operate a credit bureau has already been launched. 
Nevertheless, Zambia has very low bank penetration, with less than 15% of the population having 
bank  accounts,  according  to  the  2005  FinScope™  Survey.  Other  formal  and  informal  financial 
services do push out the landscape of access, but their impact on access is very limited. The net result 
of this is that two thirds of the adult population of Zambia are completely unserved by the financial 
sector, a much higher proportion than in any other country in the region covered by FinScope™. 
Financial exclusion is particularly severe in the rural areas. 
Mobile phone banking has not yet been launched in Zambia, though a number of initiatives are under 
development.  An  interesting  pilot  scheme  has  been  undertaken  by  Mobile  Transactions  Zambia 
Limited involving an SMS service through which cotton companies can buy cotton from farmers using 
mobile phones even when the farmer does not have a bank account – the programme is in the process 
of being fully implemented (McGrath, 2008). 
3.2.  The telecommunications sector 
The  countries  in  Southern  Africa  are  all  at  different  levels  of  information  and  communications 
technology  (ICT)  development  as  is  shown  in  Table  3.1  below.    The  selected  indicators  show 
comparatively more developed ICT sectors among the higher income countries like South Africa and 
Namibia. In Zambia, Angola and Malawi, the telecommunications sector is still characterized by the 
monopoly of state-owned operators or service providers. 
                                                 
21 The description of the financial sector in Zambia is drawn from OPM/PMTC (2008). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
Table 3.1.  ICT development in Southern Africa 
.
 
Source: World Bank ICT data. 
Another important indicator of the state of ICT development is the score and global ranking on the 
Networked Readiness Index. This is an indicator used globally to measure the propensity for countries 
to  exploit  the  opportunities  offered  by  information  and  communications  technology.
22  The 
performance of the countries in our study in terms of this index is provided in Table 3.2 below. 
Table 3.2.  Networked Readiness Index in Southern Africa 
 
Source:  The  Networked  Readiness  Index  2006–2007  rankings,  see 
www.weforum.org/pdf/gitr/rankings2007.pdf, cited in: Mouton, et al (2008). 
Only a few countries in the region already have extensive telecommunications backbones in place that 
employ  a  combination  of  microwave  radio  relays  and  fibre-optic  cables  with  other  countries  in 
                                                 
22 This is an indicator applied to a total of 122 countries. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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advanced stages of deploying their backbones. Some countries have already achieved significant fibre 
deployments in the backbone network (such as Namibia and South Africa). In general, however, the 
total  international  bandwidth  available  to  these  countries  in  the  region  is  extremely  poor  when 
compared, for example, to Europe, Asia or North America. Some of the countries that have high-speed 
inter-connected telecommunications infrastructure have already expressed plans to develop a fully-
fledged regional telecommunications network (by improving cross-border connections). 
There  are  country-specific  issues  that  are  important  to  consider  when  discussing  cross-border 
connectivity:  
  Angola‘s  telecommunications  network  was  severely  damaged  during  the  country‘s  civil  war. 
Several initiatives to develop a national fibre backbone are currently underway. However, there is 
no real competition in the telecommunications sector, which can help push for the development of 
advanced services. 
  Malawi has one of the poorest connectivity infrastructures in the region. Malawi Telecom, the 
state-owned telecommunications company, has plans to build a national fibre backbone and is 
looking  at  installing  a  cross  border  fibre-optic  link  with  Mozambique  and  a  microwave  link 
connecting Lilongwe with Zambia. These connections are expected to be in place relatively soon.  
  The  state  owned  and  monopoly  Telecomunicações  de  Moçambique  (TDM)  has  been  rapidly 
rolling out a national fibre backbone. Work on the backbone reportedly started in 2002 and was 
expected  to  be  completely  in  2008.  Mozambique  is  expected  to  have  a  fully  deployed  and 
extensive national backbone in time to connect to any of the proposed submarine cables for the 
east Africa coast. 
  Namibia has one of the most advanced telecommunications backbones in Africa with an extensive 
fibre-optic  network  developed  by  the  state-owned  Telekom  Namibia,  reaching  out  across  the 
entire country. Namibia connects to South Africa via a fibre link. Namibia is the only member of 
the SAT3 consortium without its own landing point, instead relying on transit through South 
Africa.  Namibia  is  reported  to  be  in  advanced  talks  with  Botswana  and  Angola,  to  facilitate 
Namibia‘s and Botswana‘s connection to SAT3 via Angola.  
  South Africa has the best and most extensive infrastructure in the region. The partly state-owned 
Telkom South Africa is a dominant player; recently, a second national operator called Neotel was 
licensed. For international connectivity, South Africa relies on the SAT3/SAFE cables and now 
has links with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique and Swaziland.  
  Zambia‘s state-owned telecommunications company, Zambia Telecommunications Company Ltd 
(ZAMTEL), is reported to be in the advanced stages of installing a fibre-optic backbone around 
the country. Zambia, being a landlocked country, relies on satellite for most of its international 
traffic. It has links to Botswana over SDH digital radio and an analogue PDH link to Tanzania. 
Zambia could easily link up to Namibia through a short fibre interlink since there is fibre up to the 
common border on both sides (Telecom Namibia and ZESCO). 
The problem faced by the region in terms of ICT development relates to several factors. For example, 
some of the countries in the region are landlocked (Zambia and Malawi) without the possibility of 
direct connection to submarine fibre. Such countries will have to rely on expensive satellite links for 
their international traffic and may be unable to afford or access high bandwidth links. Moreover, there 
are few countries with an extensive and high-speed backbone and access network to reach out to many 
users,  which  creates  an  artificially  ―low‖  demand  for  bandwidth.  And  even  where  an  extensive 
broadband-capable backbone and access network exist, such as in South Africa and Namibia, the 
prices  of  high-speed  connectivity  are  still  very  high,  way  beyond  the  affordability  of  a  greater 
proportion of the population. This factor, in turn, also contributes to an artificially low demand for 
international bandwidth. Thus, most telecommunications providers in the region aim for low-volume-
high margin rather than high-volume-low margins in the provision of their services. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
4.  Summary of Country Diagnostics 
As explained in the Introduction, the findings and recommendations in this report are founded on the 
detailed Country Diagnostics in Annex A. In this chapter, we provide three summaries of the findings 
of the Country Diagnostics for ease of reference. The first, at Table 4.1, is a visual Summary View of 
the regulatory landscape; the second, at Table 4.2, is a synoptic table summarizing the approach of 
each country to the various dimensions of domestic and cross-border branchless banking; and the 
third, at Table 4.3 is a summary of the m-banking position in  
Inevitably, a lot of information and nuances are lost in such a summary, so the summary view should 
be read in connection with the full synoptic table below at Table 4.2, and indeed with the full Country 
Diagnostics in Annex A.  
Table 4.1.  Synoptic Table Summary View 
Key 
 
    Permissive 
    In between, or in transition 
    Restrictive 
    Unclear 
 





Domestic Branchless Banking Regulatory Framework 
Nonbank-based branchless 
banking model permissible? 
        
 
 
Outsourcing to retail agents 
permissible? 
          
Regulator/Policymaker 
Perspectives on outsourcing 
         
Electronic money services  
 




            
Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Transactions 
Who can offer them? 
 




         
Identification requirements 
 
          
 
                                                 
23 Information on the effects of AML/CFT for Angola is incomplete 
24 Transaction limits in South Africa are restrictive for PostBank, but not very restrictive for banks. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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Table 4.2.  Synoptic table 
  Angola  Malawi  Mozambique  South Africa  Zambia 




Might be permissible in 
principle, but prohibited 
in practice 
Definitions unclear, key 
laws (e.g. Payments 
System Law) still 
pending. Appears not to 
be permissible 
Yes. Nonbank e-money 
institutions permitted by 
law, though no 
regulations yet in place 
No.  While nonbanks 
often take lead role in 
branchless banking 
initiatives, only banks 
may issue e-money, so 
joint venture required. 
Yes 




25 to banks, but 
does not directly address 
whether banks may 
outsource deposit-taking 
function. In practice, 
prohibited. 
Laws unclear and 
outdated; in practice, 
some outsourcing is 
permitted. Draft Banking 
Act and Microfinance 
Act (pending Parliament 
approval) would allow 
outsourcing.  
Yes.  ―Deposit brokers‖ 
permitted to collect 
deposits on behalf of 
deposit-taking 
institutions. 
Yes – very liberal  While law does not 
explicitly permit or 
prohibit outsourcing, a 
wide variety of services 






Law is interpreted as 
prohibiting outsourcing 
for deposits, but some 
other services are 
outsourced 
Reserve Bank and other 
policymakers are willing 
to consider outsourcing a 
variety of services. 
Reserve Bank would like 
to put a legal framework 
in place. 
E-money issuance and 
use of retail agents 
expressly permitted.  
A wide range of services 
can already be 
outsourced 
Central Bank supportive 
in theory, inclined to 
allow development 





Only banks may issue e-
money, and banks may 
not outsource e-money 
issuance to retail agents. 
Currently considering 
Outdated legal 
framework does not 
officially recognize 
electronic transactions; 
in practice, some bank-
Bank and non-bank e-
money services 
permitted by law, but no 
regulations yet in place. 
Ministry of Finance 
Yes, but only by or 
through banks 
Yes, by both banks and 
non-banks 
                                                 
25 The term ―deposit taking‖ is used in this synoptic table and in Annexes A and B to mean the ―cash in‖ function of financial transactions – following the use of the 
term to ―take deposits‖ in the CGAP Branchless Banking Diagnostic Tool which provides the framework for the study. It is not meant to imply that agents taking in 
cash in this way are deposit-taking institutions in the formal sense. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
  Angola  Malawi  Mozambique  South Africa  Zambia 
designing a scheme to 
enable inter-operability 
b/w banks. 
based e-money services 
are being introduced. 
beginning process of 
developing regulations. 
Effect of AML/CFT  No comprehensive legal 
framework, but official 
ID required, which may 
restrict access.  No 
known exemptions or 
relaxations of 
requirements for low-
value accounts.  
Strict identification and 
verification 
requirements, if applied 
as written, would 
exclude many. In 
practice, Reserve Bank 
takes flexible approach 
to minimize exclusion.  
New, more permissive 
regulations are being 
drafted.   
Identification 
requirements quite 
flexible (e.g. permits the 
use of a wide range of 
documents to identify 
clients and verify 
identity), and not a major 
barrier to branchless 
banking. 
Exemption 17 greatly 
eases the identification  
requirements for low-
value accounts for South 
African citizens and 
residents. 
Identity must be 
established through 
production of official 
identity card, but such 
cards are nearly 
ubiquitous. There is 
considerable flexibility 
in verification of name 
and address requirements 
Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Transactions 
Who can offer 
them? 
Has to go through a bank 
or exchange house. MTC 
services available, but 
only through a bank or 
exchange house.  
Restricted to banks and 
the post office apart from 
very small gifts 
Only banks and the post 
office – MTC services 
available only though a 
bank 
Previously restricted to 
banks and post office, 
but now being extended 
to bureaux de change. 
MTCs allowed to 
operate only through 
banks or bureaux de 
change 
Banks and registered 
―payment system 
businesses‖ – which may 
include MTCs, mobile 
operators, and other 
providers – allowed to 
offer cross-border 
services 
Transaction limits  Exchange control 




Strict limits  No limits, but approval 
required over $5K 
Postbank transfers 
limited to approx. $200 
per month.  Outward 
transfers at banks subject 
to $50,000 annual limit. 
All FX transactions must 
be recorded, which has 
cost implications.  
Very liberal up to 
$5,000, above which 




ID document required. 
Currently excludes many 
people.  Proof of legal 
As for domestic (see 
AML/CFT above).  
Proof of legal residence 
Significant flexibility.  
Proof of legal residence 
not required. 
Exemption 17 does not 
apply to cross-border 
transactions, so 
Significant flexibility.  
Proof of legal residence 
not required. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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  Angola  Malawi  Mozambique  South Africa  Zambia 
residence not explicitly 
required. 
not currently required, 
but may change upon 
enactment of regulations. 
requirements are 
restrictive.  Proof of 
legal residence required 
for bank transfers 
(except Postbank). 
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Table 4.3.  Current m-banking provision 
(See next page for notes on countries not covered in the table, where m-banking services are not yet available) 







Legal or regulatory 
compliance    Bank    Bank    Bank 
Dominant party in the 
value chain    Mobile operator and bank    Bank    Third party 
(a) 
Services offered    Cash deposit — withdrawal 
  Purchase of goods at 
selected retailers 
  Money transfer    Cash deposit and withdrawal 
  Airtime purchases 
  Purchase of goods at selected retailers 
Domestic money transfer    Yes — to other MTN 
Banking customers. 
  Yes — to any mobile users; by 
phone, cash-out at Wizzit 
agents 




transfer    NO    NO    NO 
Access points    Bank branches 
  Selected retailers 
  Bank branches (ABSA Bank 
and post offices) and ATMs 
  Agents 
  Vodacom outlets 
  Bank branches 
  Over  100  POS  devices  accepting 
payments from mobile phones 
Use of agents / non-bank 
provision of services 
  Neither WIZZIT nor MTN Banking uses retail agents (with the 
exception of post offices) to handle cash on its behalf.  
  At a start-up phase, but appears to be 
working with agents. 
KYC practices    Institutions must obtain and verify a customer‘s full name, date of 
birth, and identity number, using an official identity document for 
verification (covering basic transaction). 
  Celpay carries out standard KYC 
procedures - as they currently only do 
business-to-business transactions, this 
is fairly easy: the clients or distributors 
are known, with known addresses. (It 
is easy to identify them and take 
pictures of them.) 




(a) Third-party models are defined as those driven by a non-bank, non-MNO party, such as a platform provider or a money transfer company. 
(b) Celpay‘s initial focus in Zambia was on retail payments, given the desire to expand its retail footprint into other services. Because of limited initial 
retail uptake, it decided, however, to focus on business-to-business (B2B) transactions. Celpay offers corporations which have a distribution network, 
such as Coca-Cola or Zain, the ability to collect payments without cash. It does this through a multi-bank, multi-network, multi-channel platform where 
dealers pay the company via a mobile phone instruction. The Celpay account is then linked to the corporation‘s account and serves as a payment 
confirmation tool. Each party has an underlying bank account which is not an individual account opened and monitored by the bank, but a ―virtual‖ 
Celpay account.  
Notes on focus countries not represented in the table above:  
In Angola: EMIS is responsible for retail electronic payment services. Therefore, EMIS would have to design and implement any interoperable mobile 
phone-based payment scheme.  EMIS has indicated that it is in the process of examining the feasibility of such a scheme, which it hopes to implement 
by 2010. In relation to this, it is important to note that as banks in Angola are permitted to offer rechargeable prepaid cards to non-clients, it appears that 
they would be able to offer similar e-money service via the mobile phone. 
In Malawi: It is not yet clear whether only licensed financial institutions can run branchless banking schemes and the relevant pieces of legislation (e.g. 
the Payment Systems Bill) has not yet been enacted. Thus, the possibility of mobile network operators becoming licensed to operate payments services 
also remains theoretical at the moment. While the Government remains committed to extending access to financial services and allowing the use of 
innovative techniques, electronic banking services, even those provided by banks, are still a relative novelty in Malawi. The RBM has some doubts as to 
whether a nonbank-based model similar to Kenya‘s M-Pesa service could be introduced in Malawi in the immediate future.  In the short term, a bank-
based branchless banking model would be more likely to be approved. 
In Mozambique: Provision of branchless financial services by a non-bank is permitted in Mozambique. Specifically, ‗electronic money institutions‘ are 
now permitted (by law): being classified as credit institutions, they are even permitted to mobilize deposits and other reimbursable funds from the 
public. It is not yet clear, however, how such institutions will be regulated in practice. Recent amendments to the law are opening up what used to be a 
very restricted scope for outsourcing deposit-taking services and appear to allow, for example, the use of retail agents to accept deposits on behalf of a 
bank or other deposit-taking institution. At the moment though, only banks and the Post Office may send and receive funds internationally. As in 
Angola, money transfer operators such as Western Union and MoneyGram are only provided as a service of a bank; standalone agencies are not 
permitted. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
5.  Summary of Recommendations 
5.1.  Introduction 
As  demonstrated  in  the  Country  Diagnostics  in  Annex  A,  and  in  the  summaries  in  the  previous 
chapter, the five countries covered in this study (a) have very different regulatory regimes in relation 
to the potential for m-banking in general and for cross-border m-banking in particular and (b) are at 
very different stages in the development of their m-banking facilities.  
A  number  of  policy  recommendations  are  made  for  each  country  in  the  course  of  the  Country 
Diagnostics, and these are developed in the draft workshop presentation at Annex D (in a separate 
document).  The  draft  presentation  has  been  prepared  for  use  at  a  proposed  Policy  Discussion 
Workshop that will being together a select group of policy champions from each of the focus countries 
to  discuss  appropriate  incentives  that  encourage  innovative  bank  and  non-bank  led  domestic  and 
international m-banking solutions.  
The strands of these recommendations are drawn together and briefly summarized in the next section, 
and in section 5.3 we describe the elements that we recommend for a proposed follow up action plan, 
as a basis for discussion at the Workshop. 
5.2.  Summary of Key Recommendations 
5.2.1.  Recommendations for regulators/policy makers 
  Continue to improve regulatory framework for domestic branchless banking and low-value cross-
border transfers in Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia: 
-  Mozambique:  Develop branchless banking regulations; expand permitted points of service 
for low-value cross-border transfers 
-  South Africa: Consider allowing nonbank-based branchless banking model; expand permitted 
points of service for low-value cross-border transfers;  expand scope of Exemption 17 to cover 
intra-SADC transfers and foreign nationals; eliminate requirement to prove legal residence 
-  Zambia: Develop clear branchless banking guidelines for banks and nonbanks 
  Permit in parallel, as in other pioneer countries (Philippines, Kenya) the development of pilots for 
domestic (when not existing) and cross-border transactions in order to: 
-  Initiate the innovation and identify its potential positive impacts; and 
-  Identify and address the concrete issues posed by regulation 
  As a first step, create regulatory space for domestic branchless banking and low-value cross-
border transfers in Angola and Malawi:  
-  Angola:  Permit use of retail agents for cash-in/cash-out on a pilot basis; develop risk-based 
CDD approach with greater flexibility for low-value accounts/transactions; expand permitted 
points of service and reduce exchange control approval/reporting requirements for low-value 
cross-border transfers 
-  Malawi:  Enact  pending  legislation  and  develop  directives  to  provide  legal  clarity  re: 
outsourcing,  branchless  banking,  and  electronic  transactions;  enact  risk-based  AML/CFT 
regulations; increase transaction limits for stand-alone money transfer operators, and reduce 
exchange control approval/reporting requirements for low-value cross-border transfers 
  In the same way, permit pilots for domestic (as a first stage) transactions Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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5.2.2.  Recommendations regarding pilots 
  Considering  the  relatively  favorable  environment,  it  seems  possible  to  start  pilots  with  3 
objectives: 
-  Validate the feasibility (technical, business models and processes, etc.) 
-  Validate the potential positive impact (adoption, usage, etc.) 
-  Enable stakeholders to gain experience and allow regulatory framework to evolve in tandem 
with market 
  Different models can be envisaged 
-  Service provider model with tentatively: 
 Interbank Services Company (EMIS) in Angola and the 2 mobile operators 
 Malawi Switch Center (MALSWITCH) and the 2 mobile operators 
 Mozambique – possibly with Vodacom / mCel? 
 Celpay in Zambia with more important focus on poor population (through MFIs) 
-  Banking-led approach with tentatively: 
 Standard Bank (MTN partner in SA) with a representative bureau in Angola, present in 
Malawi (60% stake in Malawi‘s Commercial Bank), market leader in the Mozambique, 
and present with Stanbic Bank in Zambia. 
 First National Bank (launched Mobile banking in SA), also present in Botswana, Namibia, 
Swaziland, Mozambique, Zambia and opportunities assessed in Angola 
  The two models have 
-  positive aspects:  
 make the service available for all mobile clients,  
 the service is developed by security-focused stakeholders who can inspire confidence 
-  negative aspects:  
 promotion of the services could be less extensive than with a strong, motivated mobile 
operator 
  Potentially, some operator-led model can be promoted (for example in Mozambique) 
5.3.  Elements of the proposed follow up action plan 
The purpose of the current section is to spell out a proposed follow up action plan in relation to: 
5.3.1  Support for branchless banking initiatives targeting the unbanked 
5.3.2  Providing opportunities for stakeholders in target countries to learn from branchless banking 
pioneers worldwide 
5.3.3  Creating opportunities for extensive stakeholder collaboration and 
5.3.4  A possible pilot project for cross-border transfers 
5.3.1.  Support for branchless banking initiatives targeting the unbanked 
Use of branchless banking (BB) delivery mechanisms to expand access to financial services is in its 
infancy in most countries around the world.  Even in the countries in which branchless banking has 
achieved a measure of success, only a small minority of BB clients meet all three of the following Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
criteria: (i) they fall below the country's poverty line; (ii) they didn‘t previously hold a bank account; 
AND (iii) they are using the accounts for financial services other than airtime top-up, payments, and 
transfers.
26  Thus, the goal of using BB as a transformational
27 delivery mechanism for a full array of 
financial services has not yet been realized. 
The situation in the countries studied is no different.  Even with WIZZIT in South Africa, where 
mobile phone-enabled financial services have been available for over four years, most customers use 
mobile phones solely for purchase of airtime or for balance inquiries.
28  In the other target countries, 
BB services are at an even earlier stage of development, and most services are not yet targeting poor, 
unbanked clients. 
Many banks, mobile network operators, and other financial service providers in the target countries 
recognize the potential for using BB delivery mechanisms to target the poor and unbanked populations 
in their respective countries.  However, there is still a strongly held view among many providers and 
operators that this market tends to be high-risk, particularly in the early stages of BB development.
29  
As has been observed in other countries going through the stages of BB development, providers and 
operators in the region tend to focus first on establishing a profitable ―additive BB‖ business models  
before moving on to penetrate less familiar markets (such as the poor and the unbanked populations).
30 
Although regulators in the sample countries are gradually becoming more optimistic about the 
potential of branchless banking to improve access to finance, som e doubts and uncertainties still 
persist. That would explain why, despite the existence of a relatively favorable  formal regulatory 
framework for the provision of BB services   in general, the implementation of reforms is not 
happening as fast as some groups would wish. In other words, although financial regulators support 
BB, in some cases they are  not yet actively encouraging it, which in may sometimes have the effect of 
delaying and inhibiting innovations, particularly for cross-border transactions. 
One option would be to wait until the providers in question have developed a profitable  additive BB 
business model and then hope that the providers will experiment with the unbanked market.  Another 
                                                 
26 See http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2640/FocusNote_46.pdf, p4. 
27 By ―transformational,‖ we refer to the use of BB to provide a full range of banking services to customers who 
could not otherwise be reached profitably.  This is contrasted with ―additive‖ BB, where the service is provided 
as an additional service to current customers.  See http://www.dfid.gov.uk/pubs/files/m-banking_focusnote.pdf, 
p2-3, and http://www.finmark.org.za/documents/R_branchlessbanking.pdf, Chapter 2.  
28 See http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2953/mobilephonebanking.pdf, Table 1. 
29 It is important to note, for example, that the experience so far with the launch of new products tailored to meet 
the needs of low-income, unbanked populations  – such as the Mzansi account in South Africa – confirms the 
huge demand for entry-level formal financial products among the low-income market. However, in the case of 
the  Mzansi  account,  the  experience  so  far  suggests  a  growing  proportion  of  its  users  who  belong  to  those 
‗currently banked‘ (and not those who are ‗unbanked‘), when comparing the profile of users between the launch 
year (2004) and the end of 2008. A recent study also points out that while a total of 6 million new accounts have 
been opened – of which two-thirds cover those who have never had a bank account before – 42% of the accounts 
opened have actually become inactive and were eventually closed, indicating that the product does not seem to 
meet entirely the needs and wants of the target market. In the same study, it was shown that while expectations 
of the participating banks on the take-up of the new product have been exceeded, the revenue generated per 
Mzansi  account  and  account  balances  were  substantially  lower  than  the  banks‘  other  equivalent  accounts. 
Interestingly, the banks reported that they lost money on each account (even considering only direct costs). See 
Bankable Frontiers Associates (2009). 
30 CGAP refers to this as the ―double gamble‖ of developing a new business model in a new market segment.  
See http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2640/FocusNote_46.pdf, p4.  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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option would be to provide matching grants or other assistance to financial service providers who 
would like to offer services to the unbanked but are reluctant to fully assume the risk and/or pay for 
upfront costs that range from financial education to installation of infrastructure to development of a 
rural retail agent network.  During the field work for this study, several providers asked whether the 
World Bank would be interested in providing support for such initiatives targeted at the unbanked, 
much as CGAP is already doing.
31  By providing technical assistance and sharing start-up costs, the 
World Bank could help to jumpstart pro-poor BB initiatives in the target countries.  The World Bank 
could either do this directly or coordinate with other donors that are interested in supporting pro -poor 
branchless banking initiatives (such as CGAP, DFID, and Gates).
32 
The demonstrative effect of pilot BB initiatives will be important not only for providers of services but 
also for financial regulators and policy -makers. In this sense it is important to highlight that while 
additive  BB  activities  may  require  only  technical  solutions  or  minor  adjustments  in  regulation, 
transformational BB services require a deeper political commitment – as changes are deeper and more 
complex, they demand a higher level of coordination amid different regulatory domains. 
5.3.2.  Providing opportunities for stakeholders in target countries to learn from branchless 
banking pioneers worldwide. 
While branchless  banking  is  still  a relatively  new phenomenon,  certain  countries  have  developed 
proportionate regulatory frameworks that provide space for innovation while minimizing key risks.  In 
the Philippines, for example, the Central Bank has worked with mobile network operators to permit 
the nonbank-based model to take off.  Similarly, Brazil has nearly a decade of experience with the 
bank-based model.   
Both regulators and financial service providers from the target countries could benefit from gaining an 
in-depth understanding of how BB operates and how it is regulated in other countries.  Study tours, 
regional conferences, and workshops are some of the ways that such information could be conveyed.  
The World Bank, in association with the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), could take a lead role 
in organizing and funding such activities.
33 
5.3.3.  Creating opportunities for extensive stakeholder collaboration 
The aim is to create opportunities for collaboration both within and between target countries – in order 
to develop a shared vision for branchless banking and build technical expertise. 
As branchless banking initiatives are at such an early stage in the target countries, formal mechanisms 
for multi-stakeholder collaboration are limited.  The need for greater collaboration and coordination 
between stakeholders is strong: while there have been efforts by individual countries to more clearly 
state  the  position  with  regard  to  proposed  BB  schemes,  the  majority  of  decisions  on  whether  to 
approve a proposed BB scheme tend to be made on an ad hoc basis, particularly in relation to cross-
                                                 
31 See http://technology.cgap.org/2007/04/10/technology-program-opens-second-call-for-applications/.  
32 It is notable that in the early stages of the develo pment of M-Pesa in Kenya, support wad provided by the 
multi-donor trust fund, Financial Sector Deepening Kenya. 
33 There is now a considerable body of written material by CGAP on the various models of branchless banking, 
including CGAP, 2008 a, b, and c, and the nine country diagnostics undertaken by CGAP using their Branchless 
Banking Diagnostic Tool (to be found at www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.11.1772/1.26.1473/). However, in 
our experience such studies are not really a substitute for face to face meetings with regulators . That is part of 
the logic behind the creation of Alliance for Financial Inclusion  (AFI), a South-South forum funded by the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation (www.afi-global.org), which is planning to support such study tours..  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
border transitions.  There is rarely a clear, shared vision for branchless banking. Efforts also tend to be 
fragmented across countries.  
Branchless banking advocates would do well to learn from the lessons of the microfinance industry.  
In countries such as Uganda and Tanzania, regulators and practitioners collaborated extensively on the 
development of a shared vision for microfinance activity.
34  By working closely within a small group, 
they were able to gain exposure to practices in other countries, develop relevant technical expertise, 
and create a team of knowledgeable advocates for good practice within the industry.  This process also 
helped  to  ensure  practitioner  buy -in  and  to  avoid  the  development  of  an  inappropriate  legal 
framework.  
While there are differences in the respective priori ties and motivations of microfinance and BB 
stakeholders, the fundamental principle still holds true: a collaborative, participatory process that 
involves key practitioners from the outset and enhances stakeholder knowledge of good practice is 
likely to lead to the best results. 
Experience  in Philippines and Pakistan shows the benefits of this approach . In the Philippines, 
collaboration between policy-makers and practitioners was essential to remove the country from the 
blacklist of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), while arriving  at regulatory accommodations 
that permitted the launch of both additive (Smart) and transformational BB systems (Globe).
35 In other 
words, this collaboration permitted the country to overcome some of the most important regulat ory 
obstacles that may stop BB before it starts. In Pakistan both the industry and the key regulator, the 
State Bank of Pakistan, are working together toward the necessary regulatory accommodations to 
develop a bank-based BB model, in the context of the country‘s Financial Inclusion Programme.  
In the field of mobile money transfers, regional initiatives are also emerging. For example, the multi-
donor  Africa  Enterprise  Challenge  Fund  is  supporting  the  development  of  Monitise  in  East  and 
Central Africa. Monitise East Africa will initially offer services in Uganda and then plans to expand 
into  neighboring  countries,  including  Burundi,  Democratic  Republic  of  Congo,  Ethiopia,  Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Zambia.
36 
Promoting the inclusion of policy-makers in these processes is critical, as changes in regulatory and 
legal framework of BB require extensive political support, especially in the case of transformational 
BB services. The creation of Sector Working Groups involving providers of services, financial 
authorities and policy-makers can be a way to track the progress of BB activities, facilitating the 
dissemination of information, best practices and lessons learned. It can also be the best way to 
promote the exchange of information at regional level.  
The World Bank could play an important role in facilitating and supporting such efforts.  In the case 
of Uganda, donors such as USAID and the World Bank played a critical role in the success of the 
collaborative approach to microfinance sector development.  By providing training, capacity building, 
and other assistance, donors helped to create a cadre of expert stakeholders that would ultimately 
support the growth of the entire sector.
37  Likewise, the World Bank could support training and formal 
                                                 
34  For  a  description  of  stakeholder  collaboration  in  Uganda,  see  http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.2189/clear_uganda_report.pdf.  For Tanzania, see 
http://microfinancegateway.com/files/29886_file_Tanzania_Essay_Ira.pdf.  
35 CGAP (2008). ―Regulating Transformational Branchless Banking: mobile phone and other technologies to 
increase access to finance‖. CGAP, Focus Notes Nº 43 
36 See http://www.finextra.com/fullstory.asp?id=19652  
37 See http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2189/clear_uganda_report.pdf. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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mechanisms for collaboration among branchless banking stakeholders, including regulators, banks, 
mobile network operators, payment service providers, MFIs, and other interested parties. 
Another organization aiming to play a similar role is the Alliance for Financial Inclusion (AFI), a 
Southern-driven initiative funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. AFI seeks to stimulate, 
support and facilitate South-South policy learning and exchange. Mobile banking is one of the six 
financial inclusion policy areas covered by AFI. In this sense, AFI aims to facilitate face-to-face and 
online interactions between policy makers and other stakeholders involved in BB. Its activities will also 
include regional working groups and peer reviews, South-South exchange events involving study tours, 
exchange visits and secondments, as well as on-the-job training and research grants.  
Another important actor supporting experimentation in BB sector is GSMA, which recently launched 
the Mobile Money for the Unbanked program, also funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation.  
5.3.4.  Cross-border transfers: a possible pilot project   
From a regional perspective, perhaps the most important issue is to address the issue of high cost for 
sending remittances from South Africa. During the field work, a SADC official suggested launching a 
pilot project specifically aimed at bringing the ―taxi money‖
38 into the formal financial sector.  The 
goal would be to identify the sources of the high costs of cross-border remittances from South Africa.  
There are two main possibilities: 
  Limited competition leads to pricing that is not based upon actual costs of providing the services 
in question; and/or 
  Extensive regulation in relation to cross-border transactions leads to high compliance costs that 
raise the cost of doing business. 
A  pilot  project  could  provide  limited  exceptions  to  the  current  regulatory  framework  in  order  to 
identify the main drivers of high costs.  For example: 
  To address the issue of limited competition, a nonbank could be permitted to offer low-value 
cross-border services.  In keeping with the emphasis on the potential of branchless banking, such a 
product could be targeted at a mobile network operator, for example. 
  To  address  the  issue  of  extensive  regulation,  banks  could  identify  the  regulatory/reporting 
requirements  that they  believe  are  responsible for  higher  costs.   Then, they  could  work  with 
regulators and policymakers to develop alternatives that could lower costs without introducing 
undue risk. 
For the purposes of an initial pilot project, one could start with a country that is an important recipient 
of low-value remittances from South Africa.  With respect to the countries that we are studying, 
Mozambique and Malawi would be the logical choices.  Mozambique, in particular, has extremely 
high volumes of low-value remittances from South Africa. 
Mozambique  may  be  a  good  choice  for  several  reasons.    The  World  Bank  is  sponsoring  the 
development of electronic banking regulations and training for Central Bank staff in Mozambique.  In 
addition, a major mobile network operator (MNO) in Mozambique is very interested in offering both a 
                                                 
38 This refers to funds that are transferred across border via taxi drivers and other informal mechanisms.  Genesis 
Analytics estimates that most small-value remittances from South Africa travel via taxis, friends and family, and 
other such informal mechanisms.  See http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/34557_file_1.pdf. The SADC 
official was Dave Mitchell, the SADC Payment System Project Leader Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
domestic  and  cross-border  electronic  wallet.    The  model  still  has  to  be  introduced  and  proven 
domestically, but the MNO indicated that they would be very interested in exploring the South African 
market once their domestic product is established. 
To address the issue of extensive regulation, and for the purpose of this pilot project, engaging with 
policy-makers is essential as immigration has become a very sensitive issue in South Africa in the 
recent years. In this way, an initiative aiming to reduce the cost of sending remittances could be seen 
as an attempt to promote immigration 
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Annex A  Country Diagnostics 
In  this  Annex  we  set  out  the  detailed  country  diagnostics  that  underlie  this  report,  and  that  are 
summarized in the Synoptic table in Chapter 4 of the main report.  
The  questionnaire  for  the  country  diagnostic  studies  was  based  on  a  modified  form  of  the 
CGAP/DFID Branchless Banking Diagnostic Template:
39 the issues that were addressed on that basis 
are described in Annex B.   
The  diagnostic  for  each  country  as  set  out  in  this  report  follows  a  similar  pattern.  After  a  brief 
summary, the diagnostic covers, as appropriate: 
1.  Domestic Branchless Banking Regulatory Framework 
  Permissibility of a Nonbank-Based Branchless Banking Model 
  Permissibility of Outsourcing the Provision of Financial Services to Retail Agents 
  Current Law 
  Central Bank (and Other Policymakers‘) Perspectives 
  Provision of Electronic Money Services by Banks 
  Effect of AML/CFT Requirements on Access to Finance 
2.  Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Transactions 
  Types of Institutions that may offer Cross-Border Services 
  Transaction Limits and Other Exchange Control Requirements 
  Identification Requirements 
The country diagnostics cover: 
A.1  Angola 
A.2  Malawi 
A.3  Mozambique 
A.4  South Africa and 
A.5  Zambia. 
                                                 
39 See www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.11.1772/1.26.1473/  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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A.1.  Angola Country Diagnostic 
A.1.1.  Summary 
Although the Angolan law is relatively liberal in terms of non-bank provision of payment services, in 
practice the provision of such services is currently restricted to banks. The law does not appear to bar 
the use of agents for the provision of financial services, but again this is not permitted in practice. 
Current policies appear to be aimed mostly at the formalization and consolidation of financial service 
provision within the banking sector. Certain non-deposit services, however, can be and are accessed 
outside bank premises through ATMs and POS terminals, and banks are  also experimenting with 
mini-branches in retail stores. 
Since they are permitted to offer rechargeable prepaid cards to non-clients, it would appear that banks 
would be able to offer similar e-money services via the mobile phone. To be interoperable between 
banks will require the Interbank Services Company (EMIS) to design and implement such a scheme, 
which they are currently considering.   
Angola does not yet have a comprehensive legal framework addressing money laundering and/or the 
financing  of  terrorism.  So  to  ensure  that  payments  for  exports  –  diamonds  in  particular  –  are 
channeled through banks, foreign exchange operations are limited to specifically authorized financial 
institutions. Many citizens do not currently have the National Identity Card required to access banking 
services, but the Government is making a major effort to disseminate them.
40 
It is banks that dominate cross -border services: Western Union and MoneyGram do not exist as 
independent entities; they are merely marketed as a service provi ded by a bank or exchange house 
(though we believe that the latter are largely inactive in cross-border services). 
Angola is one of only 19 IMF member countries that still maintain exchange controls on current 
account transactions, even on low -value transactions.  Identification requirements for cross -border 
transactions are the same as for domestic transactions.  Proof of legal residence is not required, so non-
residents may use a foreign passport to prove identity and conduct transactions.   
A.1.2.  Domestic Branchless Banking Regulatory Framework 
A.1.2.1  Permissibility of a Nonbank-Based Branchless Banking Model 
The Angola Payment Systems Law (―Payment Systems Law‖) establishes the legal framework for 
payment  services in  Angola.  The  law  anticipates that payment  system  stakeholders  may  include 
banks, credit unions, ―payment service providers,‖ and ―operators of payment subsystems,‖ among 
others.
41  A Notice issued by the National Bank of Angola (BoA) states that in addition to banks and 
credit unions, payment services may a lso be provided by nonbank financial institutions, the Post 
Office, and authorized nonfinancial legal entities.
42 
While participation in the payment system therefore appears on the surface to be quite open, it is more 
limited in practice.  In response to th e low levels of usage of formal financial institutions  – some 
                                                 
40 We were unable to meet the relevant department of the National Bank of Angola to confirm our impression 
that  there  are  no  exemptions  or  relaxations  of  the  identification  requirements  for  low-value  accounts  or 
transactions. 
41 See Payment Systems Law, Art. 5 (http://www.bna.ao/download/inc_downloading.asp?iFile=361).  
42 See Aviso No. 01/2002 de 01 de Novembro, Art. 6 (http://www.bna.ao/artigo.aspx?c=207&a=640).  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
estimates place the percentage of the population with a bank account at less than 10% – and concerns 
about money laundering (see below), the government is making a concerted effort to ―bank‖ the 
unbanked  population.    As  a  result,  many  financial  services  are  available  only  through  banks.  
Currently, only banks are permitted to participate in the retail payments system or issue electronic 
money  (e-money).
43  Therefore, under the current legal framew ork, a nonbank-based branchless 
banking scheme along the lines of M-Pesa or GCash would be prohibited in Angola.
44 
A.1.2.2  Permissibility of Outsourcing the Provision of Financial Services to Retail Agents  
Current Law 
The Financial Institutions Law (―FIs Law‖) defines ―banks‖ as institutions whose primary activity is 
(i) the acceptance of deposits or other reimbursable funds from the public; (ii) to be used on their own 
behalf; (iii) in order to grant credit.
45  The FIs Law emphasizes the ―Principle of Exclusivity‖: only 
banks may accept deposits or other reimbursable funds from the public to be used on their own 
behalf. 
At first glance, the FIs Law would appear to prohibit outsourcing the collection of deposits to retail 
agents.  However, the language of the law is less rigid than it might initially seem.  While the law is 
clear that only banks may accept deposits to be used on their own behalf, it is silent as to whether a 
bank could instruct an agent to accept deposits on behalf of the bank.  Some other countries that also 
limit  deposit-taking  to  banks
46  allow banks to outsource the  collection  of  deposits  on  the  banks‘ 
behalf;  Brazil  is  one  such  example.
47  In addition, the  FIs  Law  even  has  provisions  that  clearly 
establish a bank‘s responsibility for the actions of its agents,
48 which implies that certain activities 
may be outsourced to agents.   
Therefore, the language of the  FIs  Law  does  not  necessarily  create  an  absolute  barrier  to  the 
outsourcing of deposit-taking activities.  Whether such outsourcing is permitted would depend upon: 
(i) whether any other regulation expressly permits or prohibits banks from outsourcing the collection 
of deposits; or (ii) in the absence of such regulation, whether the BoA is willing to approve such 
outsourcing.
49 
                                                 
43 As noted earlier, the Post Office is also permitted to provide money transfers and other payment-related 
services.  However, these services are still under development. 
44 We were unable to definite ly determine whether the prohibition on a nonbank -based branchless banking 
scheme stems from a law, policy, Central Bank notice, or other regulatory proclamation.  As noted below, the 
National Bank of Angola (BNA) acknowledged our requests for a meeting bu t did not grant one.  We hope that 
BNA representatives will be able to attend the upcoming regional conference and clarify this issue. 
45 See Financial Institutions Law, Art. 2.11. 
46 For simplicity, we use ―banks‖ here to refer to any fully prudentially-regulated deposit-taking institution. It 
should also be noted that the term ―deposit taking‖ is used in this Annexe and in Annex B to mean the ―cash in‖ 
function of financial transactions – following the use of the term to ―take deposits‖ in the CGAP Branchless 
Banking Diagnostic Tool which provides the framework for the study. It is not meant to imply that agents taking 
in cash in this way are deposit-taking institutions in the formal sense. 
47 See, e.g.,  CGAP, ―Use of Agents in Branchless Banking for the Poor: Rewards, Risks, and Regulation,‖ p10 
(http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2585/FocusNote_38.pdf).  
48 See Financial Institutions Law, Art. 124. 
49  We  are  currently  investigating  wh ether  see  whether  any  specific  regulations(Notices/Avisos, 
Instructions/Instrutivos, or Directives/Directivas) pertaining to outsourcing exist.   Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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The FIs Law does not address the outsourcing of other (non-deposit-related) financial services, such as 
bill payments and money transfers.  As noted earlier, only banks may issue e-money or participate in 
the retail payments system.  However, while such restrictions would prevent a nonbank-based model 
from being launched, they would not prevent a bank from creating its own bank-based scheme that 
would  allow  customers  to  conduct  other  financial  transactions  outside  of  a  bank  branch.    In  the 
absence of any regulation or BoA statement to the contrary, banks could offer e-money services that 
use mobile phones (similar to bank-based services offered by WIZZIT and MTN Banking in South 
Africa) or POS devices (such as prepaid cards that can be used for purchases, bill payments, and/or 
money transfers). 
Central Bank and Other Policymakers’ Perspectives 
While the FIs Law does not necessarily prohibit the outsourcing of deposit-taking to retail agents, in 
practice it is interpreted as if it did.  Given that many other financial services may only be provided by 
banks – including issuance of e-money, participation in the retail payments system, and facilitation of 
cross-border payments (see below) – it is perhaps not surprising that Angolan banks would not be 
permitted to outsource a core banking function such as deposit-taking.  Current policies appear to be 
aimed mostly at the formalization and consolidation of financial service provision within the banking 
sector. 
That said, certain financial services other than deposit-taking are already conducted outside of bank 
premises.    Using  Multicaixa,  an  interoperable  ATM  and  POS  network  that  is  operated  by  the 
Interbank Services Company (EMIS),
50 bank clients can access a variety of domestic financial services 
at ATMs and POS devices, including withdrawals, debit card purchases, cash-back (currently only at 
select POS devices), bill payments (currently available at ATMs and expected to be made available at 
POS devices in 2009), domestic inter -bank transfers (ATMs only), telephone airtime top -up, and 
balance inquiries.  Therefore, while outsourcing the deposit-taking function remains off-limits (at least 
for now), the BoA is allowing banks to outsource the provision of certain other banking services  – 
including cash-back, where a retail agent handles the customer‘s cash. 
In addition, some banks are trying to expand their network of deposit-taking service points by creating 
mini-branches.  These mini-branches, which may be housed in retail stores such as supermarkets,
51 
offer services such as deposit -taking  and payments.  However, they must be staffed by bank 
employees.  Therefore, while the upfront and ongoing costs would be lower for a mini-branch than for 
a full branch, it is likely still more expensive to operate a mini -branch than to allow retail agents  to 
offer these services directly.
52   
A.1.2.3  Provision of Electronic Money Services by Banks 
As institutions that are permitted to issue e-money, banks are also allowed to offer e-money services 
to non-clients.  For example, Banco Sol has launched the ―Kumbu‖ card, a rechargeable, VISA-
branded  prepaid  card  that  can  be  used  for  payments,  cash-back,  and  other  transactions  without 
                                                 
50 EMIS (Empresa Interbancaria de Serviços) is a corporation that is responsible for the  facilitation of retail 
electronic  payment  services  among  commercial  banks  in  Angola.    It  is  owned  by  participating  Angolan 
commercial banks (15 as of October 2008) and the BoA. 
51 One example is the state-owned Savings and Credit Bank (BPC), which is in the process of setting up  mini-
branches in NossoSuper supermarkets throughout the country. 
52 Experience from other countries suggests that both the setup costs and per -transaction costs are significantly 
lower for agent-assisted financial services than for branch -based services.  See CGAP, ―The Early Experience 
with  Branchless  Banking‖,  p2.    CGAP  Focus  Note  No.  46  (http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.2640/FocusNote_46.pdf).  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
requiring a bank account.
53  However, this card must be purchased and recharged at a bank branch; the 
card may not be topped up at a retail  agent.  This limits outreach to places where a bank branch 
infrastructure is already in place. 
Since they are permitted to offer rechargeable prepaid cards to non-clients, it would appear that banks 
would be able to offer similar e -money services via the mobile phone.  If so, this would have the 
potential to expand access further by allowing clients to perform certain transactions anywhere with a 
mobile phone signal.  However, as noted earlier, EMIS is responsible for retail electronic payment 
services.  Therefore, EMIS would have to design and implement any interoperable
54 mobile phone-
based payment scheme.  EMIS has indicated that it is in the process of examining the feasibility of 
such a scheme, which it hopes to implement by 2010.  
A.1.2.4  Effect of AML/CFT Requirements on Access to Finance 
Current CDD/KYC Requirements for Opening Accounts, Conducting Transactions, Etc 
For  several  years,  the  government  and  the  BoA  have  been  working  on  drafting  AML/CFT 
laws/regulations.
55  However, Angola does not yet have a comprehensive legal framework addressing 
money laundering and/or the financing of terrorism.
56  Early efforts to limit money laundering have 
focused on ensuring that payments for exports  – diamonds in particular  – are channeled through 
banks.
57  Accordingly, foreign exchange operations are limited to specifically authorized financial 
institutions
58 (as described below). 
To access banking services, one of the following documents is required: National Identity Card 
(Bilhete de Identidade or BI); driver‘s license; or foreign passport.  A BI is mandatory, but a large 
percentage  of  the  population  –  estimates  vary,  but  likely  more  than  half  –  still  lacks  one.    The 
government has embarked upon a large-scale effort to provide a BI to every citizen by 2015,
59 sending 
mobile vans to remote areas and reducing the turnaround time from several months to approximately 
one week.    
To the authors‘ knowledge, there are no exemptions or relaxations of the identification requirements 
for low-value accounts or transactions.  Repeated requests to meet with the relevant officials in the 
Banking Supervision department of the BoA were acknowledged, but a meeting was not granted. 
                                                 
53 See http://www.bancosol.ao/Canais/Arquivo.asp?articleid=618&lang=1.  
54 Some banks are beginning to offer mobile phone -based services to their customers, but they are intrabank 
services only. 
55  See  World  Bank  &  IMF,  ―Anti-Money  Laundering  &  Combating  the  Financing  of  Terrorism:  Regional 
Videoconference—Central and West Africa Region,‖ p20 (2003) 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/docs/aml_francoafr_eng.pdf).  
56 See http://www.anti-moneylaundering.org/africa/Angola.aspx.  
57  See  World  Bank  &  IMF,  ―Anti-Money  Laundering  &  Combating  the  Financing  of  Terrorism:  Regional 
Videoconference—Central and West Africa Region,‖ p21 (2003) 
(http://www1.worldbank.org/finance/html/amlcft/docs/aml_francoafr_eng.pdf).  
58 See Foreign Exchange Law No. 5/97, Arts. 7 & 10. 
59 See http://www.unisys.com/about__unisys/news_a_events/09028905.htm.  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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A.1.3.  Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Transactions 
A.1.3.1  Types of Institutions that may offer Cross-Border Services 
Banks  dominate  the  provision  of  cross-border  services  in  Angola.    Exchange  houses  (―casas  de 
cambio‖) are also permitted to send or receive funds, provided that they have a relationship with a 
money transfer company (such as Western Union or MoneyGram) or a bank.
60  Many banks have 
established relationships with Western Union or MoneyGram to facilitate cross -border transfers, but 
all such transactions must go through a branch.  Western Union and MoneyGram do not exist as 
independent entities; they are merely marketed as a service provided by a bank.  While these services 
could be offered by a small branch, the transactions themselves would have to be conducted by bank 
employees, not by retail agents (as discussed above). 
A.1.3.2  Transaction Limits and Other Exchange Control Requirements 
Angola is one of only 19 IMF member countries that still maintain exchange controls on current 
account  transactions.
61  Even low-value transactions require prior approval.  Payments for the 
maintenance of relatives living abroad are limited  to USD 2,000 per person per month, and the 
relatives must be direct descendants who are financially dependent or incapable of working.
62 
In addition, Western Union places its own limits on cross -border transactions.
63  While exchange 
control regulations limit individuals to an annual aggregate of USD 60,000 in outbound transfers, 
Western Union only allows up to USD 15,000 per person per year.
64  
A.1.3.3  Identification Requirements 
Identification requirements for cross-border transactions are the same as for domestic transactions.  
Proof of legal residence is not required, so non-residents may use a foreign passport to prove identity 
and conduct transactions.   
                                                 
60 The source of this information is The Payment System Department of BoA.  We need, however, understand 
better the extent to which ―casas de cambio‖ are actively involved in the provision of cross-border services.  Our 
impression is that they‘re largely (possibly completely) inactive, but we need to find more evidence to establish 
whether or not this is the case. 
61 As of end of 2006.  See Jefferis, Keith, ―The Rationalization of Foreign Exchange Controls in Angola‖ (2007). 
62 IMF, ―Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 2005,‖ p44 (preview available 




63 We need to check whether MoneyGram also has company-imposed limits. 
64 E.g., http://www.payment-solutions.com/agentdetails.asp?ID=286786.  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
A.2.  Malawi Country Diagnostic 
A.2.1.  Summary 
Because the issue has not yet had to be addressed by the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM), it is not yet 
clear  whether  only  licensed  financial  institutions  can  run  branchless  banking  schemes  such  as 
electronic  wallets. The  Payment  Systems  Bill  (drafted  in  2002)  has not  yet been  enacted,  so  the 
possibility of mobile network operators becoming licensed to operate payments services also remains 
only theoretical. The Government is nevertheless committed to extending access to financial services, 
and is therefore open to permitting innovative techniques. Electronic banking services, however, even 
those provided by banks, are still a relative novelty in Malawi. 
The current legal framework is not clear as to whether use of agents to conduct financial transactions 
outside  of  bank  and  financial  institution  (FI)  branches  is  permitted,  though  draft  microfinance 
legislation contains draft provisions for the outsourcing of certain banking functions to agents. The 
continued  absence  of  a  Payments  System  Law  means  that  there  is  no  modern  enabling  legal 
framework for payments systems, which are still regulated under an Act of 1967. 
While recognizing the inadequacy of the current legal framework, the RBM is very interested in 
electronic banking and mobile banking, encouraging it to the extent that they can under existing laws 
and  regulations.  In  addition,  a  Financial  Services  Bill  that  would  be  applicable  to  all  financial 
institutions has been drafted.  In its current form, this Bill would explicitly permit the RBM to issue 
directives governing outsourcing by financial institutions. 
The AML/CFT Act prescribes KYC and CDD rules that include the need for some information and 
documentation that might be difficult for migrants and other poor clients to provide. The Act would, 
however, appear to permit (regulated and supervised) agents to perform some of the KYC functions, 
rather than requiring that full verification of identity be conducted at a branch. 
In consultation with the RBM and financial institutions, Malawi‘s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is 
currently drafting AML/CFT regulations under the AML/CFT Act. These regulations would take a 
flexible approach to the subject, including a risk-based approach to Customer Due Diligence. 
Foreign exchange policies are restrictive in Malawi, and virtually all outward cross-border transfers 
(apart from small ―gifts‖) must be conducted through an ―authorized dealer bank.‖ There are strict 
limits on the purchase and remittance of foreign exchange.  In general, identification and verification 
requirements for cross-border transactions are the same as for domestic transactions, but it is unclear 
to  what  extent  some  of  the  AML/CFT  provisions  would  be  applied  in  practice  under  the  draft 
regulations. It is also unclear whether any relaxation or exemption of the verification requirement for 
low-value transactions would apply to cross-border transactions as well.   
A.2.2.  Domestic Branchless Banking Regulatory Framework 
A.2.2.1  Permissibility of a Nonbank-Based Branchless Banking Model 
―Banking business‖ – defined to include: (i) the acceptance of deposits or other funds from the public 
or other banks; and (ii) the use of such funds for lending or investment – is limited to banks and other 
licensed financial institutions (including pension funds, insurance companies, investment funds, and 
investment companies).
65  It is unclear whether branchless banking schemes such as electronic wallets 
                                                 
65 See Banking Act, Section 2(1) (defining ―banking business‖ and ―financial institutions‖) and 3(1) (limiting 
banking business to banks and financial institutions)  
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would fall under the definition of ―banking business,” as this issue has not yet been addressed by the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM).
66  If they did, that would preclude a mobile network operator (MNO) 
from providing e-wallet services unless it was licensed as a financial institution.   
 On the other hand, the Draft Payment Systems Bill  – if enacted – would appear to create space for 
some form of the nonbank-based branchless banking model.  The Bill would authorize the RBM to 
allow nonbanks to participate in a payment or settlement system,
67 and RBM staff suggested that an 
MNO might be able to receive a license as a ―Payment Systems Operator.‖  However, the question of 
which  services  could  be  offered  under  such  a  model  remains  unanswered.
68  Perhaps  more 
importantly, the Payment Systems Bill was drafted in 2002, yet it still has not been enacted.  
Therefore,  the  Payment  Systems  Operator  designation  may  remain  purely  theoretical  for  the 
foreseeable future. 
Despite the lack of a clear, enabling framework for nonbank -based electronic financial services, 
government interest in banking the unbanked population is high.  As a result, financial regulators and 
policymakers are generally open to innovative methods to expand access to formal financial services.  
Experience in other countries suggests that governments looking to promote innovation in their 
financial sectors have managed to create the necessary regulatory space to do so (in some cases simply 
by allowing regulators to  adjust regulations  – or, in many cases, simply to interpret the law and 
regulation – in a manner that allows for the innovations). The experience so far shows that regulators 
often tend to have a deliberately reactive stance, giving providers a certain advantage in terms of the 
time to evolve or develop.  
The experience is somewhat mixed: in some countries this ‗legal uncertainty‘ carried considerable 
risks, such as has been demonstrated in M-Pesa‘s experience – where it was constantly under attack 
for  its  regulatory  status.
69  CGAP‘s  policy  and  technology  team  notes  that  even  without  explicit 
prohibitions to a branchless banking proposition in a given country, and even if providers do not act 
                                                                                                                                                        
… footnote continued from previous page. 
(http://www.rbm.mw/general_info/docs/BANKING%20ACT.pdf).  
66 In countries where such products have been permitted, the Central Bank has concluded that the activity did not 
constitute  ―banking business.‖  In the Philippines,  for example, Globe Telecom‘s e-wallet  was treated  as a 
remittance service rather than as a deposit account.  See CGAP, ―Use of Agents in Branchless Banking for the 
Poor: Rewards, Risks, and Regulation,‖ p12 (http://collab2.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2585/FocusNote_38.pdf).  
67 See Draft Payment Systems Bill, Chapter III, Part I, Clause 10 (draft as of March 2009). 
68 The RBM has indicated that it prefers to retain the flexibility to determine the specific payment services that 
may be offered by nonbanks at some future date or dates, rather than listing such services in the Payment 
Systems Law and having to amend the Law if changes are required. [Jerry added] 
69 While the Government of Kenya was keenly aware that the legal and regulatory framework (covering banking, 
payment systems, and telecommunications), following the launch of M -PESA in 2007, did not offer an optimal 
situation for the development and use of branchless banking models, the various government stakeholders met to 
discuss the legal and policy implications of the M -PESA model. Initial discussions even made the need for 
coordination among policymakers and regulators stronger, in order to ensure that (i) the regulatory environment 
is open and clear to foster innovation and growth and (ii) regulators are able to engage in adequate oversight to 
ensure the safe and healthy development of branchless banking. (See: CGAP: Notes on Regulation of Branchless 
Banking in Kenya, November 2007.) The government has since embarked on develo ping a Comprehensive 
Financial Sector Reform and Development Strategy  – where improving access to finance will be one of the 
strategy‘s three main pillars; while the other two are safety and efficiency. Meanwhile, because of concern by 
the banks and others about the safety of M-Pesa, the Minister of Finance ordered an emergency audit of M-Pesa 
in December 2008, which gave M-Pesa a clean bill of health (Statement by Joseph Kinyua, Permanent Secretary 
to the Treasury, 24 January 2009) Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
irresponsibly,  the  regulator  may  tend  to  have  a  somewhat  conservative  interpretation  or  view  of 
branchless banking, and simply resist a branchless banking proposition for lack of understanding of 
the risks, limited supervisory capacity, etc. In such cases, the absence of an enabling framework may 
cause delays and inhibit innovations in the financial system. 
There are, however, positive experiences as well. In Mexico, banks have been delivering services 
through  agents  years  before  agency  regulations  were  issued.  In  this  case,  the  regulations  were 
introduced  as  a  means  to  improve  the  rules  of  the  game,  and  not  to  stop  providers  or  inhibit 
innovations. The Philippines is also another famous example of a flexible regulatory approach that 
enabled the development of branchless banking. In this case, the GCash scheme did not fall neatly into 
a  preexisting  category  for  products  or  institutions.   In  response,  the  Bangko  Sentral  ng  Pilipinas 
(Philippine  Central  Bank)  worked  closely  with  G-Xchange    to  come  to  an  agreement  on  a 
proportionate regulatory framework for GCash that included transaction/balance limits, AML/CFT 
compliance requirements, and characterization of GCash agents as ―remittance agents.‖
70   
On the other hand, even bank-based electronic banking services are a relative novelty in Malawi.  
Most of the country lacks access to ATMs and POS devices, and debit cards are only beginning to be 
introduced.  While interested in the concept, the RBM questions whether a nonbank-based model 
similar to Kenya‘s M-Pesa service could be introduced in Malawi in the immediate future.  In the 
short term, a bank-based branchless banking model would be more likely to be approved. 
A.2.2.2  Permissibility of Outsourcing the Provision of Financial Services to Retail Agents  
Current Law 
The current legal framework is not clear on whether use of agents to conduct financial transactions 
outside of bank and financial institution (FI) branches is permitted.  The outsourcing of banking 
functions to non-bank agents is not explicitly addressed in the  Banking Act, 1989 or any related 
regulations.  The Banking Act requires banks and FIs to obtain written approval from the RBM prior to 
engaging in a number of activities, including the ―opening and closing of branches and static or 
mobile agencies,‖ but the use of agents does not appear to be contemplated.
71  The Act also provides 
that the RBM may issue directives related to ―sound operating practices of banks and . . . financial 
institutions,‖
72 but no directives related to the outsourcing of banking functions exist.  Section 44 
prohibits  anyone  other  than  a  bank  or  licensed  FI  from  advertising  ―that  he  performs  financial 
services” that are normally offered by banks or FIs, but this does not address the possibility of having 
a non-bank perform financial services on behalf of a bank or licensed FI. 
                                                 
70 The financial authorities in the Philippines limited the risk of GCash by requiring, among other things, daily 
and monthly transaction caps. Additionally, GCash submits monthly reports of its activities to the Central Bank. 
This approach is critical as it allows space to calibrate better the level and type of regulation to the scale of the 
provider‘s  services,  leaving  room  to  make  adjustments  as  the  market  develops.  Additionally,  the  approach 
adopted by the authorities allows space  for innovation. In this  sense, it is important  to remember that this 
arrangement was made possible at the same time that the authorities managed to remove the country from the 
blacklist of the Financial Action Task Force (FATC). This case shows that in order to foster rather than to inhibit 
the  development  of  BB  activities,  policy-makers  and  regulators  need  to  use  proportionality  as  a  guiding 
principle, such as by allowing scope for different means of compliance so that markets participants are not 
unduly restricted from launching new financial products and services. Another important lesson that can be 
learnt from this case is that is crucial to have access to reliable data about the features and scales of new BB 
models. Developing mechanisms for sharing information is an important element of the engagement process 
amid policy-makers, regulators and providers of BB services.   
71 See Banking Act, Section 25 (http://www.rbm.mw/general_info/docs/BANKING%20ACT.pdf).  
72 See Banking Act, Section 26 (http://www.rbm.mw/general_info/docs/BANKING%20ACT.pdf). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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The absence of an enabling legal framework for financial services is particularly evident with respect 
to  payment  systems  law.  The  Bills  of  Exchange  Act,  which  defines  permissible  instruments  for 
effecting payments in Malawi, was enacted in 1967. Under this Act, only cash and checks are accepted 
as  legal  means  of  payment.
73  A draft Payment Systems Bill that would modernize the legal 
framework for payments was drafted in 2002, but it still has not been enacted. 
The Draft Microfinance Act specifically provides for the possibility of outsourcing certain banking 
functions  to  agents.    In  addition,  the  Act  excludes  from  the  definition  of  “deposit”  both  (i)  the 
acceptance of funds by an agent on behalf of a bank/FI; and (ii) the acceptance of funds for the 
purposes of transfers and remittances (potentially including e-money wallets).  However, this Act has 
not yet been enacted, and a Directive on Branchless Banking has not yet been drafted. 
Central Bank’s Perspective 
While recognizing the inadequacy of the current legal framework, the RBM is very interested in 
electronic  banking.    Recently,  the  RBM  has  approved  the  rollout  of  certain  electronic  banking 
services, including a VISA debit card by National Bank and the ―Makwacha‖ debit card by First 
Merchant  Bank.   The Makwacha  card,  in  particular,  targets  unbanked  rural Malawians; it  allows 
customers who live far from a bank branch to open an account with no minimum balance and access 
their account through POS devices in rural trading stores.
74 The RBM has also approved ―mobile 
banks‖ offered by Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM),and NBS Bank.  These ―banks 
on wheels‖ travel to rural areas where bank branches do not exist.
75 
In  addition, the  RBM has  been  the  driving  force  behind the Malawi  Switch Center  (Malswitch).  
Malswitch was established by the RBM in 1999 with the goal of developing an efficient electronic 
payment  infrastructure  in  Malawi.
76  Now incorporated as a government -owned trust, Malswitch 
provides participating financial institutions with an interoperable payment service us ing a chip-based 
smart card that can be used at any Malswitch -enabled ATM or POS device.  Since the card has 
biometric identification technology and offline capability built in, it can be used by illiterate clients in 
remote areas without reliable telecomm unications service.  Several smaller banks have embraced 
Malswitch, but the larger private -sector banks have not, electing instead to develop their own 
electronic payment solutions. 
An amended version of the  Banking Act has been drafted.  Once the amended act has been enacted, 
banks would be required to seek RBM approval for new products that they would like to introduce.  In 
addition, a Financial Services Bill has been drafted that would apply to all financial institutions.  This 
Bill  would  explicitly  authorize  the  RBM  to  issue  directives  governing  outsourcing  by  financial 
institutions.
77  The RBM has indicated that it does not have a specific list of services that could be 
outsourced; rather, the RBM would be open to proposals from the banking sector.  Upon  receiving a 
proposal for outsourcing of financial service provision, the RBM would ensure that the scheme was 
properly designed, that key risks were adequately addressed, and that the RBM had the necessary 
capacity and technology to effectively supervise the proposed innovation. 
                                                 
73 See, e.g., http://www.ecommerce-journal.com/news/a_bill_that_gathers_dust_at_parliament_in_malawi.  
74 See http://www.fmbmalawi.com/makwacha.html.  
75 See http://www.bis.org/review/r080423e.pdf (OIBM) and  
http://www.gmfus.org/doc/AfricaMSMEFinanceProgrambyDBalkeJBiziwickandTWyer.ppt (NBS Bank).  
76 See http://www.malswitch.com/about.php.  
77 See Financial Services Bill, Section 34(2)(j) (draft as of March 2008). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
The RBM has also emphasized the need to develop guidelines for electronic and Internet banking.  A 
taskforce has been established to address this issue. 
A.2.2.3  Effect of AML/CFT Requirements on Access to Finance: 
Current CDD/KYC Requirements for Opening Accounts, Conducting Transactions, Etc. 
The Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act, 2006 (―AML/CFT 
Act”) requires ―financial institutions‖ – defined broadly to include money transmission services and 
other semi-formal and informal financial service providers
78 – to collect detailed customer information 
when conducting electronic fund transfers, opening accounts, or conducting one-off transactions.
79  
The financial institution must  identify and verify each customer.  For the purposes of identification, 
customers must provide ―an official or other identifying document,‖ and each customer‘s identity must 
be verified using ―reliable and independent source documents, data or information or other evidence . 
. . .‖
80   
If  the  provisions  governing  identification  and  verification  were  narrowly  construed,  some  of  this 
information might be difficult for migrants and other poor clients to provide, such as production of an 
official identity document and proof of address.
81  Financial institutions are also expected to  “take 
reasonable measures to establish the source of wealth and source of property‖ of the client.
82  Such 
requirements, if applied strictly to low-value accounts and transactions, could limit access to finance 
due to lack of documentation and because the cost of due diligence could make the provision of small-
value remittances and transfers cost-prohibitive. 
On the positive side, the Act would appear to permit agents to perform some of the Know Your 
Customer (KYC) functions, rather than requiring that full verification of identity be conducted at a 
branch.  However, it would appear that such agents would have to be regulated and supervised in 
some fashion.
83   
Central Bank’s Perspective on AML/CFT 
In consultation with the RBM and financial institutions, Malawi‘s Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) is 
in  the  process  of  drafting  AML/CFT  regulations.    The  most  recent  draft  would  provide  some 
flexibility with respect to the identification of customers by explicitly authorizing the current practice 
of accepting a letter from the customer‘s District Commissioner in lieu of a national identity card, 
passport, or driver‘s license.
84 
The requirement to verify a client‘s identity has not been commonly carried out or enforced in Malawi 
in  the  past.    The  Draft  AML/CFT  Regulations  would  require  financial  institutions  to  verify  each 
customer‘s information by contacting the District Commissioner, following up with the customer‘s 
employer, and conducting other due diligence.
85 However, the draft regulations also recognize that 
                                                 
78 See AML/CFT Act, Section 2. 
79 See AML/CFT Act, Section 24(1). 
80 See AML/CFT Act, Section 24(1). 
81 See AML/CFT Act, Section 24(2)(b). 
82 See AML/CFT Act,, Section 24(2)(b). 
83 See AML/CFT Act, Section 24(6). 
84 See Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 4(1)(b). 
85 See Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 10(1). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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there may be cases in which such verification is ―not practical.‖ In such cases, financial institutions 
could verify identity using other methods ―if it is believed to be reasonably necessary.‖
86   
Under  the  Draft  AML/CFT  Act,  financial  institutions  will  be  required  to  verify  all  identifying 
documents even in the absence of any suspicion by the financial institution. In practice, the RBM 
recognizes  that  banks  do  not  usually  verify  identity  documents  unless  there  is  a  reason  to  be 
suspicious. The RBM will therefore require greater compliance among financial institutions based on 
the AML/CFT Act and will not allow banks to accept identity documents and other approved forms of 
identification at face value.   
The Draft AML/CFT Regulations would establish a risk-based approach to Customer Due Diligence 
(CDD).  Under such an approach, financial institutions would adjust the level of CDD conducted, 
depending upon the money laundering risk posed by each particular client.
87  Low-value transactions 
or low-value accounts with balance and/or transaction limits could be subject to lighter CDD 
requirements.  The RBM is also in the process of developing a threshold below which financial 
institutions could conduct one-off transactions without verifying the client‘s identity (unless they have 
reason to be suspicious).
88 
While establishing a risk-based CDD approach would facilitate access to finance for the poor, the 
Draft Regulations do warn financial institutions to ―pay special attention to . . . [n]ew or developing 
technologies that might favor anonymity, and take measures to prevent their use in money laundering 
schemes.‖
89  While specific requirements are not enumerated, it seems likely that the RBM would hold 
institutions that offer branchless banking-enabled financial services to a higher standard with respect 
to risk mitigation. 
Finally,  the  AML/CFT  Act  and  the  Draft  AML/CFT  Regulations  appear  to  authorize  a  financial 
institution to outsource account opening and CDD responsibilities to agents.
90  Conversations with 
RBM officials confirmed this interpretation of the draft regulations.  However, the RBM emphasized 
that financial institutions would remain ultimately responsible for ensuring that such outsourcing was 
being conducted professionally. 
A.2.3.  Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Transactions 
A.2.3.1  Types of Institutions that may offer Cross-Border Services 
Foreign  exchange  policies  are  restrictive.    Virtually  all  outward  cross-border  transfers  must  be 
conducted through an ―authorized dealer bank.‖
91  The lone exceptions are the post office and a de 
minimus exemption for ―gifts‖ that do not exceed USD 100.
92  Such gifts may be sent from an outlet 
of  a  money  transmission  operator  (such  as  Western  Union)  that  is  not  connected  with  a  bank 
(operating either within a foreign exchange bureau or on a standalone basis).    
                                                 
86 See Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 10(2). 
87 See Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 18(2, 3). 
88 See Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 17(2). 
89 See Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 22(1)(d). 
90 See AML/CFT Act, Section 24(6); Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 29(3)(d). 
91 See Exchange Control (Forex and Bureaux and Foreign Exchange Fixing Sessions) Regulations, 1994 
(http://www.rbm.mw/data/xctrl/index.asp?content=xcr).  
92 We need to establish exactly what financial services are provided by th e post office, and between which 
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One reason given by the RBM for not permitting agents to conduct cross-border transfers on behalf of 
banks  relates  to  documentation  and  financial  literacy  requirements.    All  cross-border  transfers 
exceeding the USD 100 threshold for gifts require documentation to prove that the sender is using the 
funds for an approved purpose (such as maintenance of a dependent relative, educational expenses, or 
medical costs).  The RBM felt that the average retailer would lack the capacity and the equipment 
needed to comply with the documentation requirements for such transactions.  As a result, this could 
(in the RBM‘s view) affect the reliability of information submitted for the purpose of calculating 
current account surplus/deficit, which could affect Malawi‘s Balance of Payments. 
A.2.3.2  Transaction Limits and Other Exchange Control Requirements 
There are strict limits on the purchase and remittance of foreign exchange.  Outward remittances to 
relatives, which are classified as ―maintenance,‖ require proof of the relationship and are limited to 
USD 1,000 per month.  Foreign exchange purchased and remitted for other purposes (such as medical 
or educational allowances) is also subject to limits and requires documentation to support the claimed 
use of the funds.
93  Purchase of foreign exchange to pay for imported merchandise is not subject to 
limits, but the customer must provide evidence such as invoices and a bill of entry from the 
Department of Customs.
94  
A.2.3.3  Identification Requirements 
In general, identification and verification requirements for cross-border transactions are the same as 
for domestic transactions (see discussion above).  For foreign nationals who are not Malawi residents, 
a  passport  may  be  presented  in  lieu  of  the domestic  identification  documents.
95  Under the draft 
AML/CFT  regulations,  financial  institutions  would  be  expected  to  verify  a  foreign  national‘s 
identification by contacting the foreign national‘s embassy or consulate.
96    However, given the de 
facto  policy  of  not  requiring  verification  of  most  identity  documents,  it  is  unclear  whether  this 
provision would be enforced in practice. 
It is also unclear whether any relaxation or exemption of the verification requirement for low-value 
transactions would apply to cross-border transactions as well.  While the draft regulations in their 
current form would not appear to distinguish between domestic and cross-border transactions,
97 the 
RBM perceives a heightened potential for money laundering through cross -border transfers.  In 
country that continues to experience chronic foreign exchange shortages there are those who  are 
concerned that loosening requirements could increase the dangers of capital flight.
98 
                                                 
93 See Guidelines for Licensing and Operating Foreign Exchange Bureaux issued under the Exchange Control 
(Forex Bureaux and Foreign Exchange Fixing Sessions) Regulations, 1994.  
94 See Guidelines for Licensing and Operating Foreign Exchange Bureaux issued under the Exchange Control 
(Forex Bureaux and Foreign Exchange Fixing Sessions) Regulations, 1994. 
95 See AML/CFT Act, Section 24(2)(b); Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 5(1). 
96 See Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 11(1). 
97 See Draft AML/CFT Regulations, Section 17(2). 
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A.3.  Mozambique Country Diagnostic 
A.3.1.  Summary 
Provision of branchless financial services by a non-bank is permitted in Mozambique. Specifically, 
electronic money institutions are now permitted: being classified as credit institutions, they are even 
permitted  to  mobilize  deposits  and  other  reimbursable  funds  from  the  public.  It  is  not  yet  clear, 
however, how such institutions will be regulated in practice.  
Recent amendments to the law are opening up the previously very restricted scope for outsourcing 
deposit-taking services and appear to allow, for example, the use of retail agents to accept deposits on 
behalf of a bank or other deposit-taking institution. Under the Microfinance Regulations, registered 
deposit brokers are permitted to collect deposits on behalf of institutions that are licensed to accept 
deposits. No bank has yet, however, tried to establish such a relationship. 
The 2002 Money Laundering Law requires financial entities, for transactions above a certain limit, to 
check the identity and address of a client. A Decree of 2006 makes this provision less restrictive by 
widening the range of documents and other sources that can be used for customer identification. 
Identification requirements do not therefore appear to be a major barrier to branchless banking in 
Mozambique, nor indeed for cross-border transactions. 
Only banks and the Post Office may send and receive funds internationally. As in Angola, money 
transfer operators such as Western Union and MoneyGram are only provided as a service of a bank; 
standalone agencies are not permitted. Official approval is not required for transfers under $5,000 
(though clients must state the reason for sending the funds); there are no limitations on the receipt of 
funds. 
A.3.2.  Domestic Branchless Banking Regulatory Framework 
A.3.2.1  Permissibility of a Nonbank-Based Branchless Banking Model 
Provision of branchless financial services by a non-bank is permitted in Mozambique.  Amendments 
to Law No. 15/99 Regulating the Establishment and Activities of Credit Institutions and Financial 
Companies (―FIs Law‖) created a new type of provider called ―electronic money institutions‖ (―e-
money institutions‖).  Such institutions are defined as: 
―credit  institutions  whose  primary  activity  consists  of  issuing  means  of  payment  in  the  form  of 
electronic  money,  in  terms  of  the  applicable  law.  ―Electronic  money‖  is  understood  to  represent 
monetary value represented by a claim on the issuer that: I. is stored on an electronic medium; [and] 
II. is accepted as a means of payment by parties other than the issuer.‖
99 
Since e-money institutions are classified as  ―credit institutions,‖
100 they are permitted to mobilize 
deposits and other reimbursable funds from the public. Such funds may be used for the e-money 
institution‘s own purposes.
101 
                                                 
99 See Law No. 9/2004, Art. 2.1(i) 
(http://www.bancomoc.mz/documents/DOI/Lei_09_2004_ALTERA_LICS.pdf).  Note that this is an unofficial 
translation of the Portuguese text.  
100 See Law No. 9/2004, Art. 3(g)  
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It is not yet clear how the decision to define e-money institutions as credit institutions will affect 
development of the nonbank-based branchless banking model.  On the one hand, by creating a new 
type of institution, Mozambique has sent a clear message to the market that it welcomes new entrants 
in the electronic payments arena.  On the other hand, it is unclear how e-money institutions will be 
regulated.  If the Bank of Mozambique (BoM) were to subject e-money institutions to the same level 
of prudential regulation as banks, this would have the same effect as limiting e-money services to 
banks only.   
While it can be presumed that the BoM does not intend to regulate e-money institutions as if they were 
banks,
102 regulations governing e-money institutions have not yet been drafted.  According to the 
BoM, this is because there are no operators as of yet.  Thus, key risk management issues – such as e-
wallet balance limits and transaction caps; reconciliation of virtual accounts and pooled accounts; and 
consumer protection safeguards – would have to be worked out on a case-by-case basis between the 
BoM and any entity wishing to become licensed as an e-money institution. 
Although there were still no licensed e-money institutions at the time of this writing, this is likely to 
change in the near future.  At least one of the major mobile network operators is seriously pursuing an 
e-money institution license.  In response, the Ministry of Finance has issued a Request for Expressions 
of  Interest  for  the  provision  of  technical  assistance  in  developing  a  regulatory  framework  for 
electronic banking.
103 
A.3.2.2  Permissibility of Outsourcing the Provision of Financial Services to Retail Agents  
Current Law 
As originally drafted, the FIs Law did not appear to be particularly open to the idea of outsourcing the 
provision of financial services to retail agents.  Under the original version of the FIs Law, ―credit 
institutions‖ (banks, credit cooperatives, and other approved institutions) were permitted to accept 
deposits  and  other  reimbursable  funds  from  the  public.
104  The  Law‘s  Principle  of  Exclusivity 
emphasized that such services were restricted to credit institutions only.
105 
However, recent amendments have opened up space for outsourcing deposit-taking services.  First, the 
government passed Law No. 9/2004, which amended numerous provisions of the FIs Law.  Law No. 
9/2004 amended the Principle of Exclusivity to state that only credit institutions could accept deposits 
and other reimbursable funds from the public for their own use.
106  This modification to the Principle 
of Exclusivity allowed for the possibility that an  entity other than a credit institution  could accept 
deposits if the deposits were not for its own use – which is exactly what a retail agent does when 
accepting deposits on behalf of a bank or other deposit-taking institution. 
                                                                                                                                                        
… footnote continued from previous page. 
101  See  Law  No.  9/2004,  Art.  7.1 
(http://www.bancomoc.mz/documents/DOI/Lei_09_2004_ALTERA_LICS.pdf).   
102 If the BoM wished to regulate e -money institutions identically to banks, then there would be no need to 
amend the FIs Law to create e-money institutions in the first place.  The original FIs Law already permitted 
banks to facilitate electronic payment services.   See FIs Law, Art. 4.1  
http://www.bancomoc.mz/documents/GAJ/Lei_nr_15_99_01_de_Novembro.pdf).   
103 See generally http://www.devex.com/projects/financial-sector-technical-assistance-project-in-mozambique-7.  
104 See FIs Law, Arts. 3-4 (http://www.bancomoc.mz/documents/GAJ/Lei_nr_15_99_01_de_Novembro.pdf).   
105 See FIs Law, Art. 7.1. 
106 See Law No. 9/2004, Art. 7.1 
(http://www.bancomoc.mz/documents/DOI/Lei_09_2004_ALTERA_LICS.pdf).  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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Later that year, the government provided explicit authorization to outsource deposit collection to retail 
agents by enacting the Microfinance Regulations (Decree No. 57/2004).  These Regulations created 
four categories of microfinance operators.  Category D was ―deposit brokers,‖ which were defined as 
―entities registered in the terms of these Regulations to carry on the business of intermediaries in 
obtaining deposits.” 
107  Deposit brokers are permitted to collect deposits on behalf of institutions that 
are licensed to accept deposits, so long as they first register with the Bank of Mozambique (BoM).  
The BoM will only approve a registration request upon evidence of an agreement between the deposit 
broker and a prudentially regulated, deposit-taking credit institution.
108 
Interestingly, Mozambique has a history of using retail agents to collect deposits on behalf of banks.  
Such relationships between banks and retailers were common, but 17 years of civil war severed these 
links.  In the four years since the enactment of the Microfinance R egulations, however, no bank has 
tried to establish such a relationship.  BoM  staff attributes this to a combination of larger banks‘ 
limited interest in the rural market and smaller banks‘ insufficient awareness of the possibility of using 
such a delivery mechanism. 
A.3.2.3  Effect of AML/CFT Requirements on Access to Finance: 
Current CDD/KYC Requirements for Opening Accounts, Conducting Transactions, Etc. 
For deposits and occasional transactions that equal or exceed 441 minimum wages (which we believe 
to be equivalent to about US$1,150), Law 7/2002 (―Money Laundering Law‖) requires that financial 
entities identify clients through production of a valid identity document that includes proof of identity 
and a photograph.
109  The financial entity must verify the client‘s address as well.
110 
The requirements of the Money Laundering Law were clarified through the enactment of the Money 
Laundering Regulations.
111  For the purposes of client identification, an acceptable identity document 
must: (i) be issued by the competent entity; (ii) be unexpired; and (iii) include a photograph.
112  For 
the purposes of  address verification, the client may submit an identity card (or the receipt for the 
application for an identity card, if supplemented by other evidence), passport, temporary residency 
                                                 
107 See Decree 57/2004 approving the Microfinance Regulations, Arts. 1.4(h), 2(d), 6 
(http://www.salconsult.com/PDF/Legislacao/Leis/EN/Banking%20Law/Decree%2057-04_Micro-
Finance%20Regulations.pdf).    
108 See Decree 57/2004 approving the Microfinance Regulations, Art. 59.  
(http://www.salconsult.com/PDF/Legislacao/Leis/EN/Banking%20Law/Decree%2057-04_Micro-
Finance%20Regulations.pdf).    
109 See Law 7/2002 of 5 February – Law on Money Laundering, Art. 10.1 (English translation)  
(http://www.salconsult.com/PDF/Legislacao/Leis/EN/Banking%20Law/Law%207-
2002_Money%20Laundering.pdf). 
110 See Law 7/2002 of 5 February – Law on Money Laundering, Art. 10.7 (English translation)  
(http://www.salconsult.com/PDF/Legislacao/Leis/EN/Banking%20Law/Law%207-
2002_Money%20Laundering.pdf). 
111 Decree 37/2004 of 8 September – Money Laundering Regulations (English translation)  
(http://www.salconsult.com/PDF/Legislacao/Leis/EN/Banking%20Law/Decree%2037-
04_Money%20laundering%20law%20regulations.pdf).  
112 See Decree 37/2004 of 8 September – Money Laundering Regulations, Art. 8.1 (English translation)  
(http://www.salconsult.com/PDF/Legislacao/Leis/EN/Banking%20Law/Decree%2037-
04_Money%20laundering%20law%20regulations.pdf). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
permit,  or  a  certificate  issued  by  the  client‘s  local  administrative  authority.
113  Identity  cards, 
passports,  and  temporary  residency  permits  satisfy  both  the  identification  requirement  and  the 
verification requirement.
114 
In response to concerns that the money laundering requirements might restrict access to finance for 
those lacking certain forms of official identification, the government enacted  Decree No. 1/2006.
115  
This Decree significantly increases the range of documents approved for the purposes of customer 
identification.  The Decree amends the Money Laundering Regulations to permit financial entities to 
accept documents such as driver‘s licenses, military ID cards, election registration cards, refugee ID 
cards,  and social security  ID  cards.
116  In  addition, it permits financial entities to use alternative 
methods to identify their clients, including personal knowledge and testimonials.
117  The BoM requires 
all BoM-regulated financial institutions to develop internal regulations that clarify which docu ments 
and alternative methods it will accept to identify clients for the purposes of compliance with money 
laundering requirements.
118 
Through the amendments listed above, Mozambique has provided financial institutions with: (i) 
significant  flexibility  when  conducting  due  diligence  on  customers;  and  (ii)  reduced  CDD 
requirements for low-value transactions.  Therefore, identification requirements do not appear to be a 
major barrier to branchless banking in Mozambique. 
A.3.3.  Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Transactions 
A.3.3.1  Types of Institutions that may offer Cross-Border Services 
Only banks and the Post Office may send and receive funds internationally.  As in Angola, money 
transfer operators such as Western Union and MoneyGram are only provided as a service of a bank; 
standalone agencies are not permitted.  The Post Office offers international transfer services to/from 
post offices in South Africa and a few other countries.  However, the system is still manual; paper 
forms and receipts must be transferred between the two countries in order to effect a transaction.
119 
                                                 
113 See Decree 37/2004 of 8 September – Money Laundering Regulations, Art. 8.2-8.3 (English translation) 
(http://www.salconsult.com/PDF/Legislacao/Leis/EN/Banking%20Law/Decree%2037-
04_Money%20laundering%20law%20regulations.pdf). 
114  See  Decree  37/2004  of  8  September  –  Money  Laundering  Regulations,  Art.  8.2  (English  translation) 
(http://www.salconsult.com/PDF/Legislacao/Leis/EN/Banking%20Law/Decree%2037-
04_Money%20laundering%20law%20regulations.pdf). 
115 We have not been able to obtain a copy of this decree, so are relying here on references in other documents. 
116 See Capito, B., ―Evaluation of Anti-Money Laundering Mechanisms in Mozambique, 2004 to 2006‖ p133 in 
Confronting the Proceeds of Crime in Southern Africa (Chap. 6) 
(http://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/M132CHAP6.PDF?link_id=28&slink_id=
4471&link_type=12&slink_type=23&tmpl_id=3).  
117 See Notice No. 3/GBM/2007, Preamble (http://www.bancomoc.mz/documents/GAJ/AVISO_03_2007.doc).  
118 See Notice No. 3/GBM/2007, Art. 2 (http://www.bancomoc.mz/documents/GAJ/AVISO_03_2007.doc). 
119 This section is based on conversation with the Banking Supervision Department of BoM.  We were unable to 
identify any provision in the  Foreign Exchange Law & Regulations that addressed the sending and receiving of 
funds for the purpose of remittances and low -value transactions – only foreign exchange operations in general, 
for travel overseas, and for large transfers (FDI, imports, etc.).   Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
54 
 
In  addition,  the  BoM  clarified  that  retail  agents  would  not  be  permitted  to  process  cross-border 
transactions on behalf of banks.  The BoM views cross-border transfers as higher-risk than domestic 
transactions, so even low-value cross-border transactions would need to go through a bank branch. 
A.3.3.2  Transaction Limits and Other Exchange Control Requirements 
Banks may send up to USD 5,000 per transaction without seeking official approval.  However, clients 
must state the reason for sending these funds.  Fund transfers that exceed USD 5,000 require prior 
approval.  No limitations are placed on receipt of funds. 
A.3.3.3  Identification Requirements 
Identification requirements are the same for cross-border transactions as for domestic transactions.  
Therefore, clients can benefit from the significant flexibility created under the amendments to the 
Money Laundering Regulations (see above). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
A.4.  South Africa Country Diagnostic 
A.4.1.  Summary 
Only banks are permitted to issue e-money in South Africa, but the use of agents to provide financial 
services is permitted for a wide variety of financial services. 
In September 2008, the previous tight restriction of foreign exchange business to banks and Postbank 
was widened to allow bureaux de change to apply for the status that would permit them to conduct 
foreign  exchange  transactions.  While  South  African  banks  have  significant  freedom  to  outsource 
domestic transfers and other domestic financial services, cross-border transfers currently may not be 
outsourced to retail agents.  Western Union can only operate in branches, and only as a service of a 
bank or bureau de change, not as a stand-alone entity. 
There are signs of a willingness to further liberalize exchange control requirements, but it is unclear 
whether this will lead to a significant reduction in the very high cost of remittances from South Africa. 
The high charges are thought to be at least partly attributable to lack of effective competitive pressure. 
There  are  also  reporting  requirements  that  appear  to  raise  the  cost  of  remitting  funds  abroad  – 
particularly for small-value remittances.
120 
The limits on Postbank-enabled transfers from South Africa are much tighter than those for bank and 
bureau de change-enabled transfers, though there are no limits on inbound transfers. Of the countries 
covered in this study, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia accept either money orders or postal orders 
from South Africa; Angola does not.  
Foreign nationals who are legally residing in South Africa are generally tr eated like residents for the 
purposes of exchange control requirements, but documentation requirements make it impossible for 
―undocumented‖ immigrants to use formal remittance mechanisms. Some people are suggesting a 
―don‘t ask, don‘t tell‖ policy with respect to legal status, along the lines of the approach adopted by 
the USA for Mexican workers. 
AML/CFT  regulations  also  let  down  identification  requirements  that  many  low-income  South 
Africans  and  non-resident  foreign  nationals  are  unable  to  satisfy.  A  limited  exemption  has  been 
introduced for low-value accounts, but this does not apply to cross-border transactions, from which 
many low-income clients therefore remain excluded. In addition, the exemption applies only to South 
African citizens and residents, so it excludes non-resident foreign nationals (even those who are in 
South Africa legally) as well as undocumented migrants. 
Given the political climate and the possibility that Postbank will be forced to verify legal residence 
once it begins to be supervised by the South African Reserve Bank, undocumented migrants‘ access to 
formal financial services is likely to become more restricted, not less, in the near future.  
A.4.2.  Domestic Branchless Banking Regulatory Framework 
The main reason for including South Africa in the study is its role as the major receiver of migrant 
workers,  and  therefore  its  role  at  the  sending  end  of  the  remittance  corridor.  We  have  therefore 
focused  this  country  diagnostic  on  cross-border  transactions  (section  5.2),  only  summarizing  the 
domestic framework here.  
                                                 
120 The high costs of remittances seems to be driven by both the regulatory burden and the lack of competition. 
This point is addressed more fully in the Recommendations for a Follow-up Action Plan in chapter 5 of the main 
report. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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A.4.2.1  Permissibility of a Nonbank-Based Branchless Banking Model 
Only banks are permitted to issue e-money.
121  As a result, mobile network operators and independent 
providers interested in providing access to payment services have had to e stablish joint ventures with 
licensed banks in order to provide access to financial services through the use of agents and mobile 
phones.  Two well-known examples include WIZZIT, a joint venture between an independent provider 
and the South African Bank of Athens; and MTN Banking, a joint venture between mobile network 
operator MTN and Standard Bank. 
 
A.4.2.2  Permissibility of Outsourcing the Provision of Financial Services to Retail Agents  
The use of agents to provide financial services is permitted in South Africa.  The South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB) permits banks to outsource the provision of a wide variety of financial services, 
provided that the banks ensure that outsourced services (i) meet the bank‘s standards; and (ii) are 
conducted  in  accordance  with  the  bank‘s  internal  policies  and  the  outsourcing  agreement.
122  In 
addition, the Banks Act specifically permits banks to authorize other parties to accept deposits or 
make payments on their behalf.
123 
A.4.3.  Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Transactions 
A.4.3.1  Types of Institutions that may offer Cross-Border Services 
Traditionally, only ―authorized dealers‖ in foreign exchange and the post office (Postbank)
124 have 
been permitted to effect international transfers.  Since only licensed banks are allowed to register as 
authorized dealers,
125 this has limited competition within the remittance market.  In September 2008, 
this  requirement  was  loosened  to  permit  ―authorized  dealers  with  limited  authority‖ (ADLAs)  to 
effect international transfers as well.  Since both banks and bureaux de change may apply for ADLA 
status,
126 this change could increase competition in the market for cross-border transfers. 
While South African banks have significant freedom to outsource  domestic  transfers  and  other 
domestic financial services, cross-border transfers currently may not be outsourced to retail agents.  
Concerns over issues such as money laundering and proper reporting of foreign transactions have led 
the Exchange Control department to consolidate cross-border transactions in branches.  In addition, a 
breach  of  Exchange  Control  regulations  by  the  local  Western  Union  agent  led  to  a  seven-year 
banishment from the country that ended only in late 2008.
127  While Western Union has returned, it 
may only operate in branches, and only as a service of a b ank or bureau de change, not as a stand -
alone entity. 
                                                 
121 See Position Paper NPS 01/2006, Section 3.3.1.4. 
122 Banks Act Circular 14/2004. 
123 Banks Act, Section 1 (definition of “agency”). 
124 See Postal Services Act, 1998, Art. 47 (http://www.acts.co.za/post_serv/index.htm).  
125 See CGAP, ―Notes on Regulation of Branchless Banking in South Africa,‖ Section 5.5 (Feb. 2008). 
126 Of the 8 authorized dealers in foreign exchange with limited authority listed on the South African Reserve 
Bank‘s website, 7 are bureaux de change and 1 is a bank.  See 
http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/publication.nsf/WCEV/F6698D55841D101742256B4A0047939F/?opend
ocument.  
127 See http://www.businessday.co.za/articles/topstories.aspx?ID=BD4A834096.  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
That said, Exchange Control requirements have been liberalized incrementally since 1994, moving 
toward a system of notification rather than approval.  Discussions with policymakers indicated that 
they would consider permitting banks to outsource cross-border transfers to retail agents, provided that 
the necessary safeguards were put in place and the relevant transaction data were captured. 
However, it is unclear whether permitting banks to outsource cross-border remittances to retail agents 
would lead to a significant reduction in the cost of remittances from South Africa.
128  First, banks 
claim  that  compliance  with  exchange  control  reporting  requirements  and  AML/CFT 
identification/record-keeping requirements is costly; Banks and related associations mentioned issues 
such as the need to: (i) obtain and verify a street address; (ii) collect information and keep records for 
even small-value single transactions; and (iii) report on transactions ex ante, rather  than ex post (the 
latter being acceptable for debit or credit transactions).
129 Outsourcing this responsibility to agents 
may reduce but will not eliminate these compliance costs.   
Second, it is not at all clear that charges for cross -border transfers are based upon the actual costs of 
providing these services.  A recently -concluded inquiry into bank charges conducted by South 
Africa‘s  Competition  Commission  concluded that  there  was  ―no  relationship‖  between  the  prices 
charged by banks for conducting transactions and the costs that the banks incurred in providing such 
services.
130  This led the Commission to conclude that ―[b]anks do not consider per transaction costs 
at  all  in  the  setting  of  transaction  fees‖,  which  ―suggests  that  they  are  sheltered  from  effective 
competitive pressure.‖
131   
World Bank remittance data tend to corroborate this conclusion.  While the average cost of remitting 
R1,500 (approximately USD 150) through a bank to another SADC country ranged from 12% to 24% 
of  the  value  of  the  funds  remitted  (depending  upon  the  country),  both  First  National  Bank  and 
Postbank offered this service in several countries for as little as 6%.
132  While banks could argue that 
Postbank bears a lighter regulatory burden, the same is not true for First National Bank.   If high costs 
are due primarily to lack of competition, then efforts to reduce the regulatory compliance burden on 
banks are unlikely to generate significant cost savings for customers. 
A.4.3.2  Transaction Limits and Other Exchange Control Requirements 
Postbank-enabled transfers from South Africa to countries outside of the Rand Common Monetary 
Area are limited to R2,000 (approximately USD 200) per person per month, up to a maximum of 
R24,000 (approximately USD 2,400) per year.  Inbound transfers to South Africa from these countries 
are not subject to any limits.  Of the countries covered in this study, Malawi, Mozambique and Zambia 
accept either money orders or postal orders from South Africa (as does Namibia); Angola does not.   
For  bank-  and  bureau  de  change-enabled  transfers,  legal  residents  may  transfer  up  to  R500,000 
(approximately USD 50,000) per year without requiring a tax clearance certificate, provided that the 
                                                 
128 The cost of remitting funds from South Africa to other countries in the SADC region is among the highest of 
any remittance hub worldwide.  See http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/countrycorridors/.  
129 Interviews with Banking Association and Payments Association 
130  See  Competition  Commission,  ―Banking  Enquiry  Report  to  the  Competition  Commissioner‖,  p118 
(http://www.compcom.co.za/banking/Non%20confidential%20report/3%20-
%20Costing%20and%20Pricing.pdf).  
131  See  Competition  Commission,  ―Banking  Enquiry  Report  to  the  Competition  Commissioner‖,  p118 
(http://www.compcom.co.za/banking/Non%20confidential%20report/3%20-
%20Costing%20and%20Pricing.pdf).  
132 See http://remittanceprices.worldbank.org/RemittanceCosts/?from=172.  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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funds  are  used  for  gifts,  charitable  donations,  maintenance  of  a  nuclear  family  relative,  and/or 
travel.
133 
In addition, all transactions – regardless of size – must be categorized according to the Cross Border 
Foreign Exchange Transaction Reporting System
134 and electronically reported to the South African 
Reserve Bank‘s Exchange Control Department.  These requirements would appear to raise the cost of 
remitting  funds  abroad  –  particularly  for  small-value  remittances  –  which  might  make  formal 
remittance mechanisms less attractive for low-value transfers. 
A.4.3.3  Identification Requirements 
Exchange Control Requirements 
Foreign nationals who are legally residing in South Africa are generally treated like residents for the 
purposes of exchange control requirements.
135  However, foreign nationals are required to provide the 
authorized dealer with a valid permit from  the Department of Home Affairs that condones their 
temporary residence in South Africa.
136  This makes it impossible for ―undocumented‖ immigrants to 
use formal remittance mechanisms. 
Some have questioned this approach, noting that for exchange control purposes, identity could be 
adequately verified solely through the presentation of a foreign passport.  At least one author has 
proposed not requiring banks to enforce immigration laws and instituting a ―don‘t ask, don‘t tell‖ 
policy with respect to legal status.
137  Such an approach has been followed in the United States, where 
financial  institutions  may  accept  a  Mexican  ―Matricula  Consular‖  identity  document,  a  foreign 
passport, or another foreign identification without requiring proof of legal residence.
138   
While not without controversy,
139 the American approach has allowed the vast majority of US-Mexico 
remittances to go through formal channels.
140  In contrast, it is estimated that fewer than half of cross-
border remittances within the Southern African Development Community (SADC) go through formal 
                                                 
133 See Exchange Control Manual, Section F.2.2.2 
(http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV/D70021D8DEA92BF04225751C003046AE/$Fil
e/H.pdf) and Section F.5 
(http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV/DC2F1ADB95FE21164225745700338935/$File/
L.pdf).  




135 See Exchange Control Manual, Section F.3.2.1 
(http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV/F2AD7DCD59B55FD1422573FC0053FCD0/$Fi
le/J.pdf).  
136 See Exchange Control Manual, Section F.3.2.2  
http://www.reservebank.co.za/internet/Publication.nsf/LADV/F2AD7DCD59B55FD1422573FC0053FCD0/$Fil
e/J.pdf).  
137 E.g., Genesis Analytics, ―Supporting Remittances in Southern Africa,‖ p94. 
138 See Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, ―Linking International Remittance Flows to Financial Services: 
Tapping the Latino Immigrant Market.‖ 
139 See, e.g., http://www.bankofamericaboycott.com/.  
140 While exact figures are, of course, impossible to produce, the World Bank says that unreported remittances to 
Mexico through informal mechanisms are now ―a small proportion of the total.‖  Hernández-Coss, ―Lessons 
from the US-Mexico Remittances Corridor on Shifting from Informal to Formal Transfer Systems,‖ Footnote 8. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
delivery  channels.    Furthermore,  most  remittances  going  through  formal  delivery  channels  flow 
through the Postbank rather than through commercial banks.
141  This may be due in part to the fact that 
the post office does not  require proof of legal residence; it is, therefore, the only formal financial 
service provider that is available to undocumented migrants.  However, this avenue for undocumented 
migrants to access remittance services may also close in the near future.
142 
AML/CFT Requirements 
The  Financial  Intelligence  Centre  Act  (FICA)  and  accompanying  Regulations
143  establish 
identification requirements for financial transactions, including requirements to present an identity 
document – an official identity document or other acceptable document with photograph for residents, 
or a passport for non-resident foreign nationals – and a South African income tax registration number 
(if applicable).  Both residents and non-resident foreign nationals must also provide their full name, 
date of birth, and residential address.
144 
Many low-income South Africans and non-resident foreign nationals lack an official identity card or 
the ability to provide formal proof of address.
145  In order to ensure that low-income South Africans 
would not be ex cluded from the formal financial sector due to FICA requirements, a limited 
exemption for low -value  accounts  was  passed  (―Exemption  17‖).    Exemption  17  allows  banks 
(including the postal bank) and money remitters to open accounts or conduct transactions without 
obtaining  or  verifying  the  client‘s  income  tax  registration  number  or  residential  address.
146  
Furthermore,  providers  do  not  need  to  keep  detailed  records  of  identity  documents  for  such 
transactions.
147  To minimize the risks associated with allowing low -documentation accounts and 
transactions, maximum transaction and balance limits were put into place: (i) transactions are limited 
to R5,000 per day and R25,000 per month (approximately USD 500 and USD 2,500, respectively); (ii) 
the account balance may not exceed R25,000 (approximately USD 2,500) at any time; and (iii) a client 
may not hold more than one such account with a single institution.
148 
In its current iteration, however,  Exemption 17 is of little value to low-income clients looking to 
transfer funds across borders.  First, Exemption 17 is inapplicable for cross-border transfers from 
South Africa to Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, and Zambia; it is intended to be used for domestic 
transactions only.
149  In addition, Exemption 17 only applies to South African citizens and residents.
150  
Therefore, banks and money remitters are expressly prohibited from using the Exemption with non -
                                                 
141 Genesis Analytics, ―Supporting Remittances in Southern Africa,‖ pxi. 
142 The National Treasury would like to see Postbank regulated and supervised as a second-tier bank (―dedicated 
bank‖) once the Banking Act is amended to create such an institution.  Currently, the Postbank operates under 
the Postal Services Act with limited oversight from the South African Reserve Bank. 
143 See http://www.acts.co.za/fica/index.htm.  
144 See FICA Regulations, Arts. 3-6 (http://www.acts.co.za/fica/index.htm).  
145 See CGAP, ―Notes on Regulation of Branchless Banking in South Africa,‖ Section 5.3 (Feb. 2008). 
146 See Exemption 17, Art. 17(2)(a). 
147 See Exemption 17, Art. 17(2)(b). 
148 See Exemption 17, Art. 17(3-4). 
149 See Exemption 17, Art. 17(3)(b).  In general, cross-border transfers anywhere may not avail of Exemption 17.  
There are a few limited exceptions related to POS payments and cash withdrawals within the Rand Common 
Monetary Area.  However, none of these exceptions is relevant to transfers between South Africa and the other 
countries in this study. 
150 See Exemption 17, Art. 17(2)(b). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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resident foreign nationals (even those who are in South Africa legally) and undocumented migrants, 
who might benefit greatly from reduced customer due diligence (CDD) requirements. 
Both of these legal barriers will make it extremely difficult to apply Exemption 17 to low-value, cross-
border transfers.  That said, there is greater openness to (i) the possibility of extending Exemption 17 
to cross-border transactions conducted by citizens, residents, and documented non-resident foreign 
nationals than there is to (ii) allowing undocumented migrants to avail of the Exemption.   
With regard to the former, policymakers do feel that subjecting transactions to reduced due diligence 
is inherently riskier for cross-border transfers than for domestic transfers (due to money laundering 
risk).    The  Financial  Intelligence  Unit  (FIU)  emphasized  that  all  transactions  must  be  properly 
identified; there  is  not  a policy  of  ―inclusion  at  all  costs.‖    However,  some  policymakers  would 
consider allowing non-resident, documented foreign nationals to avail of Exemption 17 for domestic 
transactions and accounts.  Furthermore, they would consider the possibility of applying Exemption 17 
to CDD requirements for low-value cross-border transactions (possibly with limits lower than the ones 
for domestic transactions). 
With regard to the latter, policymakers are familiar with the US policy of not confirming that a client 
is legally in the country when providing access to financial services.  Some policymakers privately 
agree with such a policy, which would also conform to South Africa‘s long-term goal of fostering 
regional integration within SADC.
151  However, in the near term, political considerations and a recent 
wave of anti-immigrant violence would make it very difficult to effect such a change in policy.
152  
Given the political climate and the possibility that Postbank will be forced to verify legal residence 
once it begins to be supervised by the SARB (see above), undocumented migrants‘ access to formal 
financial services is likely to become more restricted, not less, in the near future.  
                                                 
151 See The SADC Framework for Integration, Section 1.2 (http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/107).  
152 Dozens of immigrants were killed and tens of thousands driven from their homes in May 2008.   See, e.g., 
http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/05/23/africa/23saf.php.  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
A.5.  Zambia Country Diagnostic 
A.5.1.  Summary  
The legality or otherwise of using agents to deliver financial services on behalf of banks and other 
licensed financial institutions  is not addressed in the relevant Zambian law. The Bank of Zambia 
recognizes  the  need  to  address  this  issue  and  clarify  the  law  in  order  to  allow  the  extension  of 
branchless banking in the country. BoZ have emphasized that they are open to the use of retail agents 
to provide a wide variety of financial services, though they would not intend to embrace a totally 
laissez-faire approach.   
Payments system legislation permits the creation of non-bank payment system providers, and the 
Central Bank has indicated that they are open to permitting nonbank money transfer operators to offer 
a low-value electronic wallet (e-wallet) service, with suitable safeguards in place. Payment system 
businesses are also permitted to offer cross-border payment services to customers, subject to BoZ 
approval.   
While the AML/CFT requirement to produce an official identity document and proof of address could 
be  difficult  for  some  poor  Zambians  to  meet,  some  flexibility  is  allowed  with  respect  to  the 
verification of name and address once an identity document has been provided, while virtually all 
adults are said to have a National Registration Card.  Remote electronic account opening is also 
permitted, provided that the customer‘s identity documents are properly verified. In line with its risk-
based approach to regulation and supervision of financial services, the BoZ is open to relaxing certain 
AML/CFT-related requirements for low-value transactions. 
A number of non-bank institutions offer domestic and/or cross-border payment services in Zambia, 
including Western Union, MoneyGram, Mobile Transactions Zambia Limited (MTZL), Celpay, and 
Cash4Africa. 
Foreign exchange controls in Zambia were largely eliminated in 1994. External payments that exceed 
USD 5,000 must be made through commercial banks. 
Detailed CDD/KYC requirements for payment system businesses are yet to be developed; the BoZ is 
working on amending the current AML directives to cover these institutions as well as banks. In 
practice,  some  payment  system  businesses  do  not  appear  to  be  very  concerned  about  identifying 
senders, at least for transactions that do not exceed USD 1,000, but BoZ feels that such low-value 
transactions present little money laundering risk 
A.5.2.  Domestic Branchless Banking Regulatory Framework 
A.5.2.1  Permissibility of a Nonbank-Based Branchless Banking Model 
The National Payment System Act, 2007 (―NPS Act‖) allows for the creation of (non-bank) ―payment 
system businesses,‖ which are defined to include entities engaged in ―providing money transfer or 
transmission services . . . .‖
153  The NPS Act does not specifically define what services may be offered 
when ―providing money transfer or transmission services.‖ However, other countries have permitted 
nonbank money transfer operators to offer a low-value electronic wallet (e-wallet) service.
154   
                                                 
153 National Payment Systems Act, 2007, Section 2(1). 
154 For example, the Philippines regulates participants in the GCash e -wallet scheme as ―remittance agents.‖  In 
addition to sending funds, GCash users can maintain small balances on their e-wallets.  For more information,  
… footnote continues on next page Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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The BoZ has indicated its openness to similar innovations in Zambia, provided that the proposed 
scheme  addresses  all  major  risks  (particularly  with  respect  to  reconciliation  and  settlement  of 
accounts) and adequately protects consumers.  BoZ has decided to allow space of innovations to be 
introduced, at least on a pilot basis, which they will closely observe, rather than to introduce a specific 
regulatory framework in advance of the innovations, which might distort the direction of innovation. 
For example, a payment system business has already received provisional approval to offer unbanked 
customers  a  mobile  phone-based  transactional  account  without  a  bank  account.  This  is  Mobile 
Transactions Zambia Limited (MTZL), which is jointly owned by Dunavant Cotton Company and 
CAD International Limited. The joint venture gained BoZ approval to run a pilot project to enable 
cotton companies to make payment to supplier farmers who do not have a bank account. The system is 
now being rolled out on the basis of the pilot, targeted at companies making payments to the unbanked 
who currently receive cash. The payees do not need a cellphone, SIM card or bank account, and the 
system is suited for high volume, low value business.
155 
A.5.2.2  Permissibility of Outsourcing the Provision of Financial Services to Retail Agents  
Current Law 
The Banking and Financial Services Act (―Banking Act”) does not directly address the permissibility 
of using agents to deliver financial services on behalf of banks and other licensed financial institutions 
(FIs)  (which  include  deposit-taking  MFIs,  leasing  companies,  and  other  providers).    Section  17 
prohibits entities that are not banks or licensed FIs from conducting ―banking business‖ or ―financial 
service  business,‖
156  but  this  does  not  clarify  whether  such  an  entity  could  perform  financial 
transactions on behalf of a bank or licensed FI. 
Central Bank’s Perspective 
The  Bank  of  Zambia  (―BoZ‖  or  ―Central  Bank‖)  recognizes  the  potential  for  transformational 
branchless  banking  (BB)  to  help  expand  access  to  finance  in  Zambia.    Access  to  finance  is  a 
government policy priority, as noted in the most recent Financial Sector Development Plan (FSDP).
157  
As in the case of the non-bank branchless model covered in section A.5.2.1 above BoZ realizes that to 
achieve the country‘s desired goals with respect to access to finance, they will need to permit retail 
agents to conduct some financial transactions. 
However, the BoZ acknowledged that Zambia‘s regulatory framework is ―not . . . very advanced‖ in 
this area.  As noted earlier, the Banking and Financial Services Act (―Banking Act‖) and its associated 
                                                                                                                                                        
… footnote continued from previous page. 
see  http://www.g-cash.com.ph/subsectionpagearticle.aspx?secid=25&ssid=43&id=86  and  http://www.g-
cash.com.ph/subsectionpagearticle.aspx?secid=25&ssid=41&id=75.    
155 An example  given by MTZL  is ―a company paying a farmer in Katete. System  will debit the company 
account and credit the farmer. If farmer has a phone he will receive an SMS informing him payment has been 
made. Farmer takes NRC and Payment Slip to registered agent. Agent will log onto account via mobile and input 
details of both. On validation agent will pass phone to farmer to type in **** pin. On physical and virtual 
verification the electronic funds will be transferred from the farmer acc to the agent with agent commission, 
agent will pay cash to farmer.‖ From  McGrath (2008). See also www.mtzl.net/info.   
156 Banking Act, Section 17 
(http://www.boz.zm/Instruments/Zambia%20Banking%20and%20Financial%20Services%20Act.pdf).  
157 See, e.g., Ministry of Finance and National Planning, ―Financial Sector Development Plan: 2004-2009 – 
Executive  Summary,‖ Section 1.1, para. 2 (―One of the  widely recognized principal  obstacles to economic 
growth has been the state of the financial sector, which . . . is characterized by low financial intermediation (with 
little access to financial services for the rural population and the low-to-middle income earners‖) . . .).  (2004) 
(http://www.boz.zm/FSDP/ExecutiveSummary.pdf).  Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
regulations  and  circulars  do  not  explicitly  address  the  questions  of  (i)  whether  banks  and  other 
financial institutions may outsource the provision of financial services to retail agents; and (ii) if so, 
which types of services may be outsourced. 
Nevertheless, the BoZ emphasized that they are open to the use of retail agents to provide a wide 
variety of financial services.  While a financial license is required to offer financial services directly, 
the BoZ would consider allowing a retail agent to provide services on behalf of a licensed provider, 
provided that the scheme was preapproved by the BoZ prior to implementation.  The BoZ describes its 
approach as a risk-based, model-specific approach that considers the type and value of the service 
offered and looks closely at the specific details as to how the scheme would operate in practice and 
how the relevant risks would be managed.   
While open to considering potential BB initiatives, the BoZ also emphasized that such initiatives 
would  need to  meet  prior  BoZ  approval, and that  such  approval  would  not  amount  to  a  ―rubber 
stamp.‖    The  BoZ  intends  to  closely  scrutinize  proposed  BB  arrangements,  and  they  would  not 
embrace a more laissez-faire approach, such as the approach taken until very recently in Kenya.
158 
While the BoZ declined to speculate as to the exact financial services that could  be provided by 
agents, early evidence suggests that many services could be outsourced.  Agents are already being 
used to open bank accounts
159 and disburse salaries and other payments,
160 and the concept of using 
agents to accept deposits and process withdrawals from bank accounts has been accepted by the BoZ 
and is in the process of being rolled out.
161   
A.5.2.3  Effect of AML/CFT Requirements on Access to Finance: 
Current CDD/KYC Requirements for Opening Accounts, Conducting Transactions, Etc. 
The Prohibition and Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2001 (―AML Act‖) requires the BoZ to 
issue Directives governing money laundering for all entities under its supervision.
162  Pursuant to this 
Act,  the  BoZ  issued  the  Bank  of  Zambia  Anti-Money  Laundering  Directives,  2004  (―AML 
Directives”), which require banks and licensed FIs to identify customers when opening accounts or 
conducting transactions.
163  These identification requirements include the production of an official 
identity document (National Registration Card, passport, or driver‘s license) and the verification of the 
customer‘s name and address.
164   
While the requirement to produce an official identity document and proof of address could be difficult 
for some poor Zambians to meet, the Directives do provide flexibility with respect to the verification 
of  name  and  address  once  an  identity  document  has  been  provided  –  in  addition  to  the  typical 
                                                 
158 The M-PESA e-money transfer service in Kenya has operated with little oversight from the Central Bank of 
Kenya, and M-PESA‘s contractual agreements with their customers disclaim liability for the actions of retail 
agents offering services on their behalf.  The BoZ indicated that it would not be comfortable with such an 
approach. 
159 Barclays has opened ―sales centers‖ in rural areas where agents facilitate the opening of bank accounts. 
[Conversation with Banking Supervision]. 
160 See MTZL PPT presentations; conversation with Brad Magrath, MTZL. 
161  See  Celpay  PPT  presentation;  conversation  with  Miyanda  Mulombo,  Celpay;  MTZL  PPT presentations; 
conversation with Brad Magrath, MTZL. 
162 See AML Act, Sections 2(1) (definitions of ―regulated institution‖ and ―Supervisory Authority‖) and 12(4). 
163 See AML Directives, Sections 6-7. 
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production of a utility bill, other means such as obtaining a reference from the customer‘s employer, 
another  bank  customer,  or  a  ―customary  authority‖  (such  as  a  village  chief)  are  acceptable.
165  
Transaction records and copies of identification records must be kept for at least 10 years.
166 
The  Directives  also  permit  banks  and  FIs  to  establish  procedures  for  remote  electronic  account 
opening,  provided  that  the  customer‘s  identity  documents  are  properly  verified.
167  This  could 
facilitate account opening by agents, at least in theory, which could eliminate the time and cost of 
traveling to the nearest branch.   
Central Bank’s Perspective 
Identification.  The BoZ is convinced that the requirement to produce an official identity document is 
not a barrier to access to finance in Zambia.  It describes Zambia‘s National Registration System as 
―very well-established,‖ stating that virtually all adults (16 years or older) have a National Registration 
Card. 
Proof of Address.  The BoZ recognizes that proof and verification of address is more challenging.  In 
some high-density areas, for example, housing numbers are not well-established and utility bills may 
be hard to come by.  While insisting that there must always be some proof of address, the BoZ feels 
that the AML Directives provide sufficient alternative means of proving address to ensure that low-
income Zambians will not be prevented from using formal financial services. 
Remote and Agent-Assisted Account Opening.  While Section 6(4) of the Directives would appear 
to permit account opening without any face-to-face meeting between the customer and the financial 
service provider (provided that the customer‘s identification documents were properly verified), the 
BoZ clarified that to open an account, some sort of face-to-face meeting would still be necessary.  
However, the BoZ emphasized that an agent could perform such necessary KYC verification on behalf 
of a licensed financial institution – in fact, at least one bank is already using agents to facilitate 
account opening in rural areas.  In addition, the BoZ noted that it would reconsider this issue if it felt 
that the requirement for a face-to-face meeting was hindering access to formal financial services. 
Exemptions/Relaxations  for  Low-Value  Accounts/Transactions.  In  line  with  its  risk-based 
approach  to  regulation  and  supervision  of  financial  services,  the  BoZ  is  open  to  relaxing  certain 
AML/CFT-related requirements for low-value transactions.  The BoZ would consider more flexibility 
on issues such as identification and remote account opening if it felt that this were necessary to 
achieve the policy objective of expanding access to formal financial services.  At present, however, no 
specific requirements have been identified as creating a barrier to access that needs to be addressed. 
A.5.3.    Regulatory Framework for Cross-Border Transactions 
A.5.3.1  Types of Institutions that may offer Cross-Border Services 
As in the other four countries studied, banks are permitted to offer cross-border payment services.  In 
addition, as discussed above, the NPS Act allows for the creation of ―payment system businesses.‖  
Subject to BoZ approval, payment system businesses are permitted to offer cross-border payment 
services to customers.  Since these providers need not be banks or other financial institutions licensed 
under the Banking Act, the NPS Act helps to create legal space for the development of a competitive 
market for cross-border money transfer services in Zambia. 
                                                 
165 See AML Directives, Section 7.B. 
166 See AML Directives, Section 10; and AML Act, Section 13(1)(a). 
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A number of non-bank institutions offer domestic and/or cross-border payment services in Zambia, 
including Western Union, MoneyGram, Mobile Transactions Zambia Limited (MTZL),  mentioned 
above, Celpay, and Cash4Africa.
168  Cross-border services by nonbanks outside of MoneyGram and 
Western Union are still limited, but this does not appear to be due to any significant regulatory 
impediments (at least under Zambian law).  Rather, a number of providers indicated that while the y 
were interested in offering cross -border services in the future, they were focused on establishing a 
profitable domestic business first before taking on the challenges inherent in working internationally. 
A.5.3.2  Transaction Limits and Other Exchange Control Requirements 
Foreign exchange controls in Zambia were largely eliminated in 1994.
169  External payments that 
exceed USD 5,000 must be made through commercial banks.
170  For transactions conducted outside of 
a bank branch ( i.e.  at  a  payment  system  business  or  an  agent  offering  such  services),  a  walk-in 
customer may send up to USD 1,000 (per person, per transaction, per day) without a bank account, or 
up  to  USD  5,000  (per  person,  per  transaction,  per  day)  if  the  funds  come  directly  from  a  bank 
account.
171   
Some payment system businesses have put in place additional limits.  For example, Western Union 
limits customers to a maximum of USD 5,000  received  and  USD  1,000  sent  per  person,  per 
transaction, per day.
172   
A.5.3.3  Identification Requirements 
As entities subject to BoZ regulation and supervision,
173 payment system businesses are required to 
comply with the AML Act.  However, since the NPS Act was enacted only in 2007, the BoZ has yet to 
issue  money  laundering  Directives  for  payment  system  businesses.    As  ―regulated  institutions,‖ 
payment system businesses are still subject to requirements of the AML Act, including the requirement 
to keep transaction and customer identification records for 10 years.
174  However, detailed CDD/KYC 
requirements for payment system businesses have not   been developed; the BoZ is working on 
amending the current AML Directives to cover these institutions as well.   
In practice, some payment system businesses do not appear to be very concerned about identifying 
senders, at least for transactions that do not exceed USD 1,000.  The BoZ is also less concerned about 
these services, since it feels that such low-value transactions present little money laundering risk. 
 
                                                 
168 For a complete list of designated payment system businesses and their partners, go to http://www.boz.zm/ and 
click on ―Designated Payment Systems‖ under the ―Payment Systems‖ category in the left frame. 
169 See Circular 3/94, ―Foreign Exchange Control Liberalisation.‖ 
170 See Circular 8/01, ―New Measures on Foreign Exchange Transactions‖ 
171 This information was provided by BoZ: we have not yet found the legal document where these limits are 
explicitly prescribed. 
172 E.g., http://www.payment-solutions.com/agentdetails.asp?ID=570976.  
173 NPS Act, Section 11 
174 AML Act, Section 13(1)(a). Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
66 
 
Annex B  Regulatory Issues Addressed in the Country Diagnostics 
In this Annex we set out the key regulatory issues that are addressed in the country diagnostics, as 
proposed in the Inception Report. They are based on the CGAP/DFID Branchless Banking Diagnostic 
Template,:
175 
1.  Permissible models for mobile payments and issuance of electronic money – Depending upon 
the country, these may include the ―bank-based‖ model (where customers have a direct contractual 
relationship with a prudentially-regulated financial institution) and the ―non-bank-based‖ model 
(where customers open virtual ―electronic money‖ accounts that are stored on the server of a 
mobile phone operator or other non-bank). 
2.  Rules on the use of agents for deposit-taking (i.e. taking in cash) / remittances and client 
identification
176  –  CGAP  has  emphasized  that  branchless  banking  will  not  achieve  its 
transformational potential unless banks and non-banks are permitted to use retail agents equipped 
with  information  and  communication  technologies  (ICT)  to  take  small  deposits,  process 
remittances, and perform client identification.  
3.  Effects of money laundering and terrorist financing rules on access to m-payment services 
by low-income clients – Customer verification and identification requirements that are intended 
to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing may impede access by poor customers who 
lack official identification documents or a verifiable address. 
4.  Payment system regulation – Cost-effective access to the payment system by a wide variety of 
providers is a key factor enabling the rapid take-off of branchless banking.  To facilitate this, 
regulators  need  to  address  the  risks  created  by  m-payment  activity  through  proportionate 
regulation that distinguishes between m-payments and traditional banking business.
177 
5.  Competition regulation – Policymakers and regulators should encourage interoperability, and 
they should ensure the feasibility of achieving interoperability at low cost in the future.  At the 
same time, they should take care to provide adequate space and incentives for pilot efforts by early 
innovators.
178 
6.  Consumer  protection  regulation  –  Certain  consumer  protection  requirements  –  such  as  a 
prohibition  on  servicing  of  deposits  outside  of  bank  branches  –  may  affect  the  regulatory 
feasibility of a branchless banking initiative.  At the same time, other requirements may need to be 
implemented to ensure that clients are protected, such as (i) holding the principal (bank or non-
bank) directly responsible to the client for the actions of a retail agent that is performing services 
                                                 
175 Following the principles laid down in the CGAP diagnostic template and in CGAP‘s Focus Note 43 of 
January  2008,  ―Regulating  Transformational  Branchless  Banking:  Mobile  Phones  and  Other  Technology  to 
Increase Access to Finance,‖ which in turn builds upon David Porteous‘ 2006 report for DFID, ―The Enabling 
Environment for Mobile Banking‖. 
176 The term ―deposit taking‖ is used in this Annex and in Annex A to mean the ―cash in‖ function of financial 
transactions – following the use of the term to ―take deposits‖ in the CGAP Branchless Banking Diagnostic Tool 
which provides the framework for the study. It is not meant to imply that agents taking in cash in this way are 
deposit-taking institutions in the formal sense. 
177 As discussed particularly in George Houpis and James Bell, ―Competition Issues in the Development of M-
Transactions,‖ in ―The Transformational Potential of M-Transactions,‖ Vodafone/Nokia/Siemens Policy Papers, 
No. 6, July 2007. 
178 Ibid. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
on the principal‘s behalf; (ii) ensuring that the client knows that services are provided on behalf of 
principal; (iii) providing mechanisms for redressing client grievances; (iv) ensuring privacy of 
client data; and (v) properly disclosing to the client the true cost of services provided. 
Other important regulatory issues to explore may include: 
7.  Foreign  exchange  controls  –  Rules  on  which  providers  may  engage  in  foreign  exchange 
transactions  and  what  requirements  must  be  met  for  small-value  transactions  (identification, 
record-keeping, etc.) may affect the success of small-value branchless banking. 
8.  E-commerce and e-security – Strong laws and regulations must be combined with effective 
enforcement  to  ensure  that  clients  and  customers  will  be  comfortable  engaging  in  electronic 
financial transactions. 
9.  Regulation of telecommunication companies (mobile network operators) – Key issues include 
restrictions on value-added services, joint ventures, or peer-to-peer prepaid airtime transfers; and 
overlaps in regulatory jurisdictions (between telecom and financial services regulators). 
10. Taxation  –  Taxation  of  financial  transactions  and  mobile  phone  transactions  needs  to  be 
reviewed.  In addition, any differences between the tax rates for the same financial transaction 
when performed by a mobile network operator rather than a bank needs to be noted.  
11. Policymakers’  and  regulators’  attitudes  and  policies  with  respect  to  financial  access  – 
Understanding key stakeholders‘ perspectives is critical to gauging the political will and likely 
support for efforts to create an enabling environment for transformational branchless banking.  
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Annex C  Selected International Comparisons 
In this Annex we have set out some international comparisons relating to branchless banking that 
throw light upon the diagnostics and analysis in this report – these examples and others are drawn 
upon as required in the course of the report. 
Figure C.1  Regional Overview of Main World Telecommunications and ICT Indicators, 
2006   
 
Source: ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators (WTI) Database 
Figure C.2  Mobile Penetration in Selected African Countries 
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Growth (%) Mobiles 2002-07 Mobiles (%) per 100 inhabitants  
Source: International Telecommunication Union Annual Report 2007 
























Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador Mexico Estados
Unidos
Growth (%) Mobiles 2002-07 Mobiles (%) per 100 inhabitants  
Source: International Telecommunication Union Annual Report 2007 Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
70 
 
Table C.1  Country Comparisons 


























ratio of richest 
10% to 
poorest 10% 
Africa                 
Angola  104.0  29.1  2,335  -  -  53.3  1.1  - 
Cameroon  45.3  24.3  2,299  17.1  50.6  54.6  1.5  15.7 
Egypt  46.2  39.8  4,337  3.1  43.9  42.8  6.8  8 
Kenya  57.1  30.2  1,240  22.8  58.3  20.7  3.2  13.6 
Malawi  65.0  7.6  667  20.8  62.9  17.2  0.4  10.9 
Mozambique  66.9  15.4  1,242  36.2  74.1  34.5  0.7  18.8 
Namibia  39.8  38.6  7,586  34.9  55.8  35.1  3.7  128.8 
South Africa  25.3  87.1  11,110  10.7  34.1  59.3  10.9  33.1 
Zambia  80.1  22.1  1,023  63.8  87.2  35.0  2.0  32.3 
 Asia                 
Bangladesh  100.0  21.1  2,053  41.3  84.0  25.1  0.3  7.5 
China  21.6  41.2  6,757  9.9  34.9  40.4  8.5  21.6 
 India  78.2  19.9  3,452  34.3  80.4  28.7  5.5  8.6 
Indonesia  47.6  35.3  3,843  7.5  52.4  48.1  7.3  7.8 
Japan  5.8  83.8  31,267  -  -  65.8  66.8  4.5 
Philippines  27.5  58.8  5,137  14.8  43.0  62.7  5.4  15.5 
Sri Lanka  53.7  41.3  4,595  5.6  41.6  15.1  1.4  11.1 
Thailand  50.7  123.7  8,677  < 2  25.2  32.3  11.0  12.6 
Vietnam  65.7  27.1  3,071  -  -  26.4  12.9  6.9 
America                 Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 


























ratio of richest 
10% to 
poorest 10% 
Argentina  43.8  102.2  14,280  6.6  17.4  90.1  17.7  40.9 
Bolivia  26  34.1  2,819  23.2  42.2  64.2  5.2  168.1 
Brazil  28.2  63.08  8,402  7.5  21.2  84.2  19.5  51.3 
Chile  17.4  83.6  12,027  < 2  5.6  87.6  17.2  33.0 
Colombia  49.2  73.54  7,304  7  17.8  72.7  10.4  63.8 
Costa Rica  24.6  33.76  10,180  3.3  9.8  61.7  25.4  37.8 
El Salvador  47.2  89.5  5,255  19  40.6  59.8  9.3  57.5 
Mexico  20.8  62.48  10,751  3  11.6  76.0  18.1  24.6 
United States  12.5  83.51  41,890  -  -  80.8  63.0  15.9 
 
Source: Human Development Report 2008, UNDP. International Telecommunication Union Annual Report 2007 
 
Table C.2  Smart Money, GCash, M-Pesa and WIZZIT 








Technology Platform  STK using SMS bearer  Native SMS  STK using SMS bearer  USSD 
When started?  December 2003  November 2004  April 2007  November 2005 
Who offers the service?  Smart  Communications  as 
Smart  Money 
GXchange  Safaricom  WIZZIT 
Which  mobile  networks 
my be used by users? 
Smart only  Globe  or  Touch  Mobile 
only 
Safaricom only  Any Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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What kind of accounts are 
offered 
Prepaid accounts  Prepaid accounts  Prepaid accounts  Individual  exemption  17 
accounts 
Who are the issuers?   Banco de Oro  GCash  Held by the M-PESA  Held  by  a  division  of  the 
African  Bank  of  Athens 
(SABA) 
What kind of license does 
the issuer have? 
Full banking licence  Licensed  as  remitting 
agent.  
Unlicensed.  Full banking licence. 
When  and  how  do 
customers  register  for  the 
service? 
User  completes  form  at 
Smart  Wireless  Centre  and 
shows valid ID. 
From  mobile  by  sending 
SMS  with  keyword  REG, 
followed by some personal 
data 
At  M-PESA  agent, 
providing name and ID.  
Performed  by  roving 
WIZZIT kids; users provide 
personal data and ID number 
Account  opening 
requirements and fees 
Free for mobile banking; no 
minimum deposit 
Free; no minimum deposit.   Free; no minimum deposit.   ZAR  40  for  a  starter  pack. 
No minimum deposit. 
Is  a  card  associated  with 
the account? 
Optional  Maestro-branded 
debit card. 
No.   No.  Mandatory  Maestro-branded 
debit card. 
Can  a  user  have  multiple 
accounts? 
Yes  Not  on  the  same  phone 
number. 
Not  on  the  same  phone 
number. 
No. 
Are  there  limits  on  size, 
number  or  frequency  of 
transactions? 
100k per month.  Minimum  PHP  100  per 
transaction;  maximum 
PHP  10k  per  transaction. 
40k  per  day,  100k  per 
month. 
Maximum KES 35k.  Yes;  for  Exemption  17 
accounts,  maximum  balance 
ZAR  25k,  maximum 
transaction ZAR 5k. 
Can the user transact from 
another  person 
SIM/phone? 
No,  but  user  can  transact 
using  the  associated 
MasterCard 
No  No  No,  but  user  can  transact 
using the associated Maestro 
card 
Who monitors and reports 
on suspicious transactions? 
Smart,  in  delegation  from 
the issuing bank 
GXI  Safaricom  WIZZIT although SABA has 
responsibility  to  Central 
Bank Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 








Can  money  be  sent  to 
nonusers? 
No  No  Yes, recipient can cash out 
at  retail  outlet  showing 
code received. 
Yes. 
Can  users  receive  money 
from nonusers? 
Yes  No  No  Yes 
Can  user  top  up  from 
other  accounts  it  holds  at 
other banks? 
Yes, from customer accounts 
at 15 mobile banking partner 
banks. 
Yes,  from  selected  banks 
only. 
No  Yes,  from  any  bank  via 
electronic funds transfer. 
In  merchant  transactions 
for  cash  or  purchase  of 
goods,  what  device  does 
the merchant use? 
POS  devises  or  mobile 
phone. 
Mobile phone  Mobile phone.  POS device. 
In  merchant  transactions 
for  cash  or  purchase  of 
goods,  who  acquires  the 
merchant? 
MasterCard  for  card-based 
POS. 
GXI  Nobody.  MasterCard 
Who initiates phone-based 
cash  deposits  transactions 
and how? 
User fill in deposit slip, goes 
to  cashier,  shows  valid  ID; 
merchant  sends  SMS 
request. 
User  fill  in  deposit  slip, 
goes  to  cashier,  shows 
valid  ID;  merchant  sends 
standard  P2P  payment 
request by SMS. 
Similar  to  basic  P2P 
transaction;  no  paper 
receipt is given.  
Not applicable. 
Who  initiates  cash 
withdrawal  transactions 
and how? 
User fill in deposit slip, goes 
to  cashier  and  shows  valid 
ID. 
User  fill  in  deposit  slip, 
goes  to  cashier,  shows 
valid  ID;  user  sends 
standard  P2P  payment 
request by SMS. 
User gives mobile number 
to  agent  and  shows  ID; 
then  selects  ―withdraw  
cash‖  from  STK  menu; 
enters agent number, cash 
value and PIN 
Not applicable. 
Other  services:  account 
management. 
Free  access  to  the  current 
credit balance. 
PHP  for  the  cost  of  the 
SMS to make the request. 
KES 1.  ZAR  1  for  account  balance 
via mobile; ZAR 5 via ATM Mobile Banking in Southern Africa: Consolidated Draft Report 
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Other  services:  buy 
airtime. 
Minimum top up of PHP 30  Free.  Free.  Free. 
Other  services:  bill 
payment 
Yes  Yes  Not applicable  Yes 
Other  services:  direct 
deposit of salaries 
Yes (similar to Smart Padala 
model) 
Only  for  rural  banks 
employees. 
Not applicable  Yes 
Other  services: 
international remittances 
Yes, in conjunction with 47 
overseas remittance partners. 
Yes,  partnering  with 
United  Coconut  Planters 
Bank 
Not applicable  No 
Source: CGAP Focus Note No 48, Banking on mobiles: why, how and for whom?  
Note: During the peer review of this paper, a question was raised as to whether BB is a key way to make microfinance more efficient. In our view, the 
answer is at least partly dependent on the nature of the microfinance provider. Most MFI-led BB initiatives have been small pilots or have had limited 
success. Even when MFIs have strong local knowledge, product development acumen and the ability to manage small loans, most lack the specialized 
technical skills to implement the BB models or tap into existing ones. For example, CGAP research in the Philippines shows that the vast majority of 
the approximately 750 rural banks in the country will need an IT overhaul to participate. In Kenya, research carried out by M-Pesa showed that group 
loan borrowers made fewer on-time repayments when they used BB systems. In fact, customers no longer attended group meetings, which are a key 
element to maintain group pressure.  
The fact that few MFIs to get involved in BB services may be linked to studies showing that less than 10 percent of all BB customers are poor and new 
to banking. This is mainly because BB is still at an early stage of development – the combined effect of providers seeking to reduce risk by focusing on 
known markets and poorer people not usually being early adopters of technology.  
Developing partnership between MFIs and banks seems to be a way to overcome these problems.  For example, SKS Microfinance in India has 
developed a mobile banking offering in partnership with Andhra Bank, in which customers use designated SKS banking agents to deposit money into 
Andhra Bank accounts and use a mobile phone to repay SKS microloans. Networking is also proven to be a way to overcome the technology barriers 
for MFIs – the Network of Rural MFIs in Ecuador is contracting a technology provider to build and maintain core banking systems and BB channels for 
the group, as a way to minimize upfront costs and the expertise needed inside each member of the organization. Mobile Banking in Southern Africa  
 
Annex D  Draft Workshop Presentation 
This is set out in a separate document 